# Heg Bad

## UQ

### UQ – Unsustainable - Commitments

#### Russia’s invasion on Ukraine demonstrates the transition away from US hegemony—no longer unipolar

**Liadze et al. 22** - a member of the macroeconomic research and forecasting team from NIESR, “The Economic Costs of the RussiaUkraine Conflict,” 2 March, 2022, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, <https://www.niesr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PP32-Economic-Costs-Russia-Ukraine.pdf>

Fifth, there is political risk and uncertainty. Russia’s Ukraine invasion has up-ended many key western assumptions about the post -Cold War order. Indeed, the invasion symbolizes the shift in global power and a move away from the unipolar world that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. U.S. hegemony has withered, and we are in a multi-polar rather than unipolar world, which is more dangerous (Mearsheimer, 2019). Uncertainty may drive up savings ratios and make firms more reluctant to invest. On the other hand, the crisis is another potential challenge to globalization, coming after trade disputes and Covid, and so manufacturers may be tempted to re-onshore some facilities. With the freezing of Russian central bank assets, its banks’ access to SWIFT being restricted, and Germany and the EU being willing to supply arms to Ukraine, risks in Russia are clearly more profound than elsewhere in Europe, with the rouble plunging on foreign exchanges (we expect it to continue its descent) and the central bank hiking interest rates to 20 per cent to contain inflationary pressure. Russian bank subsidiaries abroad have seen share prices fall precipitously and there have been queues at cash machines in Russia on worries of bank liquidity problems.

#### US Hegemony Failing Now – Ukraine and Middle East Prove

Ruairidh Wood 2019 – Wood is a Birmingham City University Graduate with a degree in Security Studies, “Promoting Democracy or Pursuing Hegemony? An analysis of U.S. involvement in the Middle East”, Pluto Journals, https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/jglobfaul.6.2.0166

The U.S.’s desire to assert their hegemony so aggressively in the Middle East may be a result of the fears that if it does not display its military power, other states will cease to feel threatened by it. The end of the Cold War saw the death of the bipolar international system that had been in place for decades and as of yet, a new structure that appears to be taking the shape of multiple strong powers is yet to be born (Bauman, 2001). The Soviet Union collapsed after the Cold War yet the U.S. has also been in decline since the conflict ended. During this period, a variety of what Gramsci calls morbid symptoms, in the form of terrorist organizations, have risen (Cohen, 2013). However, the U.S. has been reluctant to relinquish unipolar dominance and benefits it brings, leading to attempts to assert it as far and wide as possible.

The hegemony that the U.S. has asserted so aggressively in the Middle East looks to be in decline, however, with Russia and China the biggest challengers to its global power. Russia has maintained resentment towards the U.S. since the end of the Cold War and did not agree with it taking on the role of world authority (Graham, 2019). In the 1990s it did not have the power to challenge this but has slowly been resurging and has sustained a good relationship with President Assad. Successful Russian opposition to the U.S. in Syria, through the use of asymmetrical warfare and veto powers, has shown weaknesses in U.S. military power. Additionally, the lack of physical force from the U.S. in Syria is perceived as a decline in U.S. hegemony, partly because it was so aggressively involved in many Middle Eastern crises leading up to this.

Russia has also opposed the U.S. in Ukraine and the Obama administration did little to deal with Russian annexation of Crimea, even though its support for Ukraine was made official in the Budapest Memorandum. Hyper-involvement in the Middle East has drained U.S. military resources and weakened public support for heavy-handed military intervention, which has strengthened the Russian influence of power in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

U.S. hegemony in the Middle East and further afield may be in decline and its policies perhaps need rethinking, however emerging powers are reluctant to attempt world governance. Conceivably they are wary after seeing the U.S.’s failings in the region and are more cautious of making the same mistakes on the international stage.

### UQ – Unsustainable - China

#### Increasing Chinese development on emerging technologies leads to US hegemonic decline

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A third cause of great-power decline concerns the diffusion of technology. Late modernizers, such as Japan after 1864 and again in the 1960s and ’70s as well as China after 1978 can move quite quickly up the technology curve as once cutting-edge ideas and scientific breakthroughs become widely shared. In the post-World War II era, the Soviets quickly matched U.S. achievements in nuclear weapons, aircraft, missiles, and electronics, and in more recent decades, China and others have adopted advances in high-speed computing, precision weapons, and advanced technology of all kinds. While many of China’s recent advances have been accelerated by intellectual piracy and via technology transfer extorted from foreign firms wanting to invest in China, Beijing’s massive investments in science and technology have also become a factor in both military and civilian fields, and its total spending on scientific research in 2018 is for the first time estimated to equal or possibly exceed that of the United States (Guarino, Rauhala, and Wan 2018). For example, China and Russia are ambitiously pursuing research and development of advanced weapons such as hypersonic missiles, a technology in which the United States is thought to be lagging (Davenport 2018). A lesser example comes from the military use of drone technology. Once the near monopoly of the United States and Israel, this has now spread so widely that Iran and even a terrorist group such as Hezbollah have acquired the capacity to produce and deploy these weapons. The importance of technology diffusion in undercutting America’s advantages can be seen in contrast to what Barry Posen previously termed “command of the commons” (2003).5 Posen’s 2003 assessment, published at the height of America’s post-Cold War power, identified unique U.S. military advantages in the air, space, at sea, and under the sea. The implication was that with such an overwhelming advantage at that time, the United States could readily afford to reduce its overseas deployments, as its strategic predominance remained assured. Technological diffusion in the civilian sphere is also pronounced and has been increasing over the past half century. Massive expansion of trade, globalization, the role of multinational corporations, and the rapid spread of scientific and technological knowledge have all played a role. Here, too, there is evidence of how hegemonic power can be self-reversing.

#### US Hegemony Declining – China and BRICS Confirm

Makhura Benjamin Rapanyane 2020 - Makhura Benjamin Rapanyane, School of Social Sciences, University of Limpopo, South Africa, “The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi-polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns”, Journal of Public Affairs, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pa.2114.

The contemporary time is characterized by the rise of China in the international system. Based on Waldron (2005), The Asian tiger (China)'s military and economic advancement are transforming the entire structure of the international politics and economics. As such, its vast economic expansion and rapid infrastructural establishments are both provenance of Western and Japanese concerns. Thus, this is mainly led by the Chinese quest for natural resources and mineral resources and also their policy of no strings attached positioning on their financial aid (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2012). The Pentagon had also recognized China as the only country in the world to be able to challenge the US hegemony in the international system (Chen & Feffer, 2009, p. 48). The ensuing reasons behind these are: in 2015, China introduced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to counter the US engagement in monopolizing the global lending system through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Elsinga, 2015; Shangai, 2014). China had also demonstrated its interest in overtaking and exercising dominion over global connections by erecting the “New Silk Road” which runs between Western Europe and Asia with maritime and continental routes (Monteleone, 2018). These maritime routes are used by China to explore the world to significant markets like Greece's Piraeus and Gwadar's Pakistan and they are also used for the organization- facilitation between the peripheries and the core world (Komlosy, 2016). In spite of the attempts to establish and sustain “Eurasian Economic Union” by 4 of 7 RAPANYANE Russia, this will still be beneficial to China as Russia has welcomed with both hands, Chinese investment and loans in mining, pipelines as well as transport infrastructure (Kenton, 2018). China has also invaded the international areas of healthcare, medicine, life art, tourism and cooking (Komlosy, 2016). One important point to add is China's rise with manufacturing Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which often outperform USA MNCs is another problem to consider (Griffiths & Luciani, 2011; Knight, 2014). Projections show that the Asian tiger is anticipated to overtake the USA economically by 2041 (Knight, 2014). Despite the role of China in being the leading figure in the discussion of the challenging the USA hegemony, the BRICS countries at large are also engaged in efforts of countering the USA dominance of international finance. Relevant example include that they were able to launch a New Development Bank (NDB) in 2017. This has another important emerging power pattern found in BRICS, particularly as it relates to the International finance (Ernstzen, 2015). This emerging international economic Power Pattern had also invested heavily in the property investment esp. in the former industrialized countries (Komlosy, 2016). BRICS is also anticipated to overtake and outperform the combination of the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, Italy and Japan by at least the late 2030s (Kim, 2010). A number of trade agreements have also been established in Latin America to counter the US hegemony over trade such as the Bolivian Alternative of Americas (ALBA) to counter USA's hegemony over the Caribbean and Latin America's perpetuated trade hegemony (Fox, 2019).

### UQ – Unsustainable – East Asia

#### U.S heg in East Asia is impossible

Richard Hanania 2021 - Richard Hanania is the president at the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and a former Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “THE INEVITABLE RISE OF CHINA: U.S. OPTIONS WITH LESS INDO-PACIFIC INFLUENCE”, Defense Priorities, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-inevitable-rise-of-china

The final thing the U.S. should do is stop signaling its hopes of fundamentally changing who holds power in Beijing and instead focus on its own affairs. In July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a speech on China that some hawks interpreted as calling for a policy of regime change. Critics of Beijing regularly argue that the Chinese take too dogmatic an approach to issues of national sovereignty, all but admitting that mutual hostility between the powers is rooted in the desire of many in the U.S. to overthrow the government of Xi Jinping and end CCP rule, if not militarily than by encouraging internal discord. Of course, the U.S. has no ability to overthrow, at acceptable cost, the Chinese government or fundamentally change its political culture. Setting such goals makes cooperation in areas like disease prevention and climate change more difficult.

Throughout history, countries have exercised power abroad due to economic success, the factor on which great power influence rests. For the U.S. to compete with China, it should invest internally: infrastructure improvements, GDP growth, improved educational outcomes, and other measures to increase innovation and wealth creation. While such goals are difficult to achieve, it is easy to see that increasing spending on a military competition with China in its own backyard is not helpful.

U.S. influence in East Asia is destined to diminish, but that does not make America less safe. Those most fearful of China who call for more military spending, overextension, and a commitment to marshalling allies do not present any policy ideas that can reverse underlying trends, even if adopted. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, China has the advantages of geography and a relatively passive attitude toward the affairs of the rest of the world. While those advantages will continue, it is in the process of approaching and surpassing the U.S. in all measures of economic power, and to a great extent in technological and scientific achievement, all of which can be converted into superior military strength if there is a will to do so. That reality is an argument to strengthen the U.S. internally to prepare for long-term competition, if necessary. Old habits of thinking, overly optimistic analyses assuming Chinese decline or collapse, and ignoring the basic principle of compound growth have prevented the U.S. from grappling with the speed and magnitude of the shifting balance of power we are experiencing. Washington is left with the choice of either adjusting to the new reality or risking catastrophe to try and stop what is inevitable.

President Biden’s vision of competition with China requires the U.S. to look inward. As he correctly recognizes, a country that cannot solve problems at home will be in no position to preserve its influence abroad. However, if the U.S. is to ensure democracy wins the war of ideas, the world’s most important democracy cannot set standards that are impossible to meet. Making America a model for the rest of the world is achievable, while maintaining itself as the dominant power in East Asia in the face of a rising China is not. All policies related to great power competition should proceed with that understanding in mind.

### UQ – Unsustainable - General

#### US Military Hegemony Already Declining – Unsustainable Without Cooperation Between Powers

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The international system and politics are transiting in nature, ordained with continuity and change, hence, can neither remain static nor stable for a longer duration. As posited by Kennedy, the imperial overstretch of the US will eventually cause its decline as it did happen to previous superpowers. The unipolarity of the US power structure, gained in the post-Cold War era, may not last long as it was designed to suit its hegemonic and national interests, hence, contested by other emerging powers. This rapid decline is the result of an overstretch caused by her hegemonic obligations and preponderant military and economic power to invariably get involved in the global issues with the desire to meld the events in its favor. Following the footsteps of her predecessors like the Roman Empire, British Empire, and the recently melted Soviet Empire, the trajectory of the downwards spiral is a reality, not a myth.

For longevity of its dominance in international relations, the US needs to revisit its military, economic and political relationship with the rising powers since the choices and options adopted by the contesting powers would remain beyond its purview. An approach based on cooperation and mutual co-existence through economic interdependency may be the sole option left with the superpower to reconcile with the political, economic, and military differences to survive with the acquired status.

#### UQ - American hegemony is low—aftereffects of the Bush and Trump administrations

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The obvious questions to be asked are these: What has happened between the 1990s, when the power of the United States reached its apex, and now? How did America’s gigantic leverage upon a substantial part of the world weaken to the point of losing true relevance? Two names can provide the answers to these questions: George W. Bush and Donald Trump. In 2001, George W. Bush’s team came into government carrying an awkward notion about America’s might. Instead of understanding that the hegemonic system in place served their country’s interests exceedingly well, they felt that the system had to be rearranged in order to recognize the United States’ new position as sole superpower and its unmistakable primacy. As a result, they began to turn upside down a complex structure that had taken decades to build, precisely when America’s standing within it had reached its pinnacle. 78 A. T. HARDY In doing so they did not understand, as T.V. Paul asserts, that legitimacy lowers the cost of exerting power and that for a hegemonic power legitimacy results fundamental for the maintaining of supremacy. The United States had attained a stage where its supremacy was accepted by the international community as both benign and legitimate, which had required interweaving the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. However, proclaiming the futility of cooperative multilateralism, which from their perspective just constrained the freedom of action of America’s power, the Bush administration asserted the prerogatives of their country’s primacy. Moreover, the United States’ national interest had to take precedence to international law, as was made clear by President Bush before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During that time, he repeatedly emphasized that even if such invasion violated international law, his country would do whatever was necessary to ensure its security (Paul, 2018, Chapter 2). Unconcerned by international norms or by the United Nations’ rules, America became a free rider within the international system. Among many examples, the following are particularly telling: It refused to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol, as that would have imposed restraints upon its sovereignty, notwithstanding that with just 4 percent of the world’s population the country was responsible for 25 percent of the global pollution footprint; it refused to submit to the International Court of Justice, while pressuring other countries to follow suit, as its soldiers were being accused of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq; it refused to pay its quotas to the United Nations and to other multilateral organizations that did not bow to Washington’s views (Prestowitz, 2003). The Bush administration’s world became one that searched for unconditional followers and not for allies’ worthy of respect; one of ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little meaning; one of punishment to dissidence and not of encouragement to cooperation; and one where preventive action prevailed over international law. Well-known neoconservatives such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton, proclaimed America’s supremacy and derided countries not willing to follow its unilateralism. Krauthammer labelled those nations an axis of petulance, whose main problem was their irrelevance. Kagan, referring to Europe’s insistence in adhering to international norms, talked about that continent’s weakness and about its incapability to understand that raw power was the ultimate enforcer of national security. Bolton asserted that if the United Nations’ Security Council wanted to reflect the real correlation of power in the world, it should only have one member: The United States (Kagan, 2003, p. 37; Krauthammer, 2002; Toro Hardy, 2006 [1, p. 139]).

#### US Hegemony has been Fading since the Cold War

Ronald O’Rourke 2022 - O’Rourke is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field, “Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense - Issues for Congress”, Library of Congress Washington DC, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1159700

The post-Cold War era of international relations—which began in the early 1990s and is sometimes referred to as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power)— showed initial signs of fading in 2006-2008, and by 2014 had given way to a fundamentally different situation of great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

The renewal of great power competition was acknowledged alongside other considerations in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy. 2 It was placed at the center of the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS)3 and January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 4 which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia. The Biden Administration’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance states that “we face a world of rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and a technological revolution that is reshaping every aspect of our lives,” and that protecting the security of the American people “requires us to meet challenges not only from great powers and regional adversaries, but also from violent and criminal non-state actors and extremists, and from threats like climate change, infectious disease, cyberattacks, and disinformation that respect no national borders.

### UQ – Unsustainable – Inflation

#### Inflation is Decking U.S. Military Power Now

Thomas Spoehr 6/7 – Thomas Spoehr serves as director of Heritage’s Center for National Defense where he is responsible for supervising research on matters involving U.S. national defense, “The U.S. Army’s Untenable Trajectory: What Congress Should Do to Fix It”, The Heritage Foundation

Despite claims the Army’s fiscal year (FY) 2023 President’s budget request “sustains the force on a strategic path,” the opposite is true. The $46 billion cumulative loss of buying power that the Army has endured since FY 2020 has taken a severe toll on nearly every aspect of Army combat power. Budgets that have consistently failed to even keep pace with inflation have forced the Army to cut training standards, propose reducing its active end strength, cut military construction programs to historic lows, and pare many key modernization programs down to the bone. The latest rating from The Heritage Foundation’s authoritative Index of U.S. Military Strength assesses the Army as only “marginally” able to perform its role to protect the U.S. and its vital national interests. Any objective assessment would conclude the Army is on an unsustainable path.

The lack of publicly released national security and national defense strategies from this Administration makes it challenging to understand the thinking behind President Joe Biden’s decision to sharply reduce the Army’s buying power.

The return of war to Central Europe should serve as a powerful reminder that land combat remains a real possibility and that the maintenance of ready ground forces remains a crucial element of U.S. national security. President Biden’s FY 2023 defense budget for the Army belies none of that urgency. Now that the long-delayed FY 2023 defense budget has been released, it is obvious the trends observed in Heritage’s earlier report, “Congress Should Address the Impact of Four Years of Declining Buying Power on the U.S. Army,” have only accelerated.

In accordance with the law, on April 7, 2022, the Army Chief of Staff General James McConville submitted an Unfunded Priority List totaling $5.1 billion. The breadth and magnitude of the list reveals the challenges the Army is facing. Specific shortfalls in Army readiness, capacity, and capabilities can be found in the Index of U.S. Military Strength. Many of the programs on this list are worthy and Congress should support this request while identifying offsets and savings in other areas to pay for these line items. The Heritage Foundation’s Blueprint for Balance contains multiple recommendations where money could be saved in the federal budget, both in the defense budget and in other areas. Congress should further investigate what the cumulative impact of under-funding the Army has been over the past three years and act to fix those specific shortfalls.

### UQ – Unsustainable – Laundry List

#### US Heg is already dying--Trump, a rising China, Populism, and Nationalism

**Boller et al. 21** – Florian Boller is from the Department of Political Science, University of Kaiseslautern, other contributors from array of different universities and institutions like JFKI, School of Government and International Relations, etc. “Hegemonic Transition,” 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74505-9

The current international order is unraveling. Its traditional hegemon, the US, has ceased to unequivocally support the institutions it helped to foster. Us President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy has exacerbated ongoing forces pushing international politics toward a hegemonic transition. China’s power surge, contestation by smaller states, and the West’s internal struggles with populism and economic discontent have undermined the liberal order from the outside, and from within. While a diagnosis of this crisis is hardly new (acharya, 2018;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2019; Friedrichs et al., 2019), its sources, scope, and underlying politics are still up for debate. This volume offers an assessment of the ongoing transformation of hegemonic order and its domestic and international politics. In doing so, it challenges the conventional wisdom in three ways. First, the role of the US under the Trump administration with regard to the liberal order is more complex than it may seem. It varies across regimes (e.g., trade and security), regions (e.g., Asia, Europe, the Global South), and is domestically contested by actors within Congress and society. After all, states are not unitary actors whose governments are free to decide the course of their countries, regardless of domestic institutions, voters' interest, and partisan politics. The upending of traditional leadership paths by the Trump administration, in fact, was contested by traditionalists within the executive, and, more importantly, within the legislature. Thus, this argument demands a closer look at the connection between domestic politics and international relations, and the resulting patterns of hegemonic politics across policy fields and regions. Second, there is significant variance in the responses of state and non-state actors toward this instability and disruptive transformation. Some actors forge new alliances, claim authority over policies or within institutions.? Others, in particular allies of the US, such as Poland within NATO, or Israel, who significantly depend on the hegemon's security provisions, reject leadership roles for themselves and try to entice the US to maintain its traditional role. Middle powers such as India and Brazil may find themselves wedged between the US and China, and their room for strategic maneuvering will be severely limited. It is thus a central aim of this volume to dissect contestation and support toward the current hegemonic order (and the traditional hegemon) among different actors. Third, while the topical focus of our endeavor is the age of Trump and the crisis of the international order, we recognize the longer-term trends that have paved the way toward the current hegemonic transition. Economic discontents within large swaths of the electorates in the US and in Europe have, for example, propelled populist and nationalism movements that, in turn, undermined support for maintaining policies and institutions within the liberal order (see Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lammert and Werner in this volume). Furthermore, the traditional bipartisan foreign policy consensus, which provided the domestic backbone of the liberal order, has begun to erode since the end of the Cold War (see Schultz, 2017). In that regard, we hold that the Trump administration and its policies are a symptom rather than the cause of the unraveling of global order (see ye, 2019, p. 76). Consequently, the crisis of the global order will not simply vanish with the leadership change in the White House on January 20, 2021. Against such a backdrop, this volume contributes to the burgeoning discussion within the international relations (I) literature by offering theoretically informed case studies. Our reading of hegemony diverges from a static concept toward a focus on the dynamic politics of hegemonic order. This perspective includes domestic support and the demand for specific hegemonic goods, the contestation and support by other actors within distinct layers of hegemonic orders, and the underlying bargaining between the hegemon and subordinate actors.

### UQ – China

#### China has Regional Hegemony Now – US Asia Hegemony Declining

Richard Hanania 2021 - Richard Hanania is the president at the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and a former Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, “THE INEVITABLE RISE OF CHINA: U.S. OPTIONS WITH LESS INDO-PACIFIC INFLUENCE”, Defense Priorities, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-inevitable-rise-of-china

This report investigates the long-term implications of Chinese regional hegemony. In a world in which the two powers are peer competitors, the future is uncertain, and leaders are free to make decisions across a wide range of possibilities likely to fundamentally change facts on the ground. When, in a certain region, one nation has an overwhelming preponderance of power, we can be more confident it will dominate that area as long as it desires to do so. While we cannot predict much about what China will use its power for, at the very least we should expect it to seek to gain more influence in its region at the expense of the U.S. and become more likely to succeed in disputes between the two nations in which each side seeks out the cooperation of others. China will be able to assert economic and diplomatic dominance over its own region even if the U.S. maintains or increases its military presence in nations like Japan and South Korea.

Checking the rise of China through alliances is unlikely, as the countries of East Asia generally do not see it as a threat to the same extent the U.S. does; nor do they share concerns about the internal human rights situation of that country or other issues, like autonomy for Hong Kong, that American policymakers have prioritized. Moreover, contemporary military alliances in East Asia actually give the U.S. little in terms of diplomatic advantage, as disputes over Huawei and other issues reveal. Even if other countries become more willing to let the U.S. defend them militarily, American influence can still decline. Given these facts, and the greater ability of China to bring about economic and diplomatic pressure on the region due to geography, East Asian countries are more likely to accommodate it than the U.S. while avoiding decisively aligning with either power.

While American leaders talk about ways to “confront China”—which usually involves some combination of stressing human rights, economic decoupling, and expanding military commitments in the Indo-Pacific—none of their suggestions will fundamentally alter the power shift currently underway. Given this reality, the U.S. should pursue two goals in the coming decades: (1) increase its prosperity through trade and (2) avoid crises and war. On this last point, that can be done by reducing its military footprint; limiting provocative actions, like unnecessary freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea or declaring that U.S. forces will defend Taiwan; and halting even implicit calls for regime change. This would not only decrease tensions, but also potentially help the human rights situation in China by reducing perceptions of threat. Effectively pursuing long-term American interests in the region must begin with clarity about what the U.S. can realistically accomplish given its distance from East Asia and weakening position over time. Those hoping democracy will win out in the global marketplace of ideas should focus less of their energy on foreign confrontation and more on reforming domestic institutions.

### UQ – China/NoKo – US heg counterbalance 1NC

#### China’s actions with the Pyongyang nuclear issue shows their desire for a counterbalance to US military presence in east Asia – US heg in east Asia is in danger

Yu, Sui ’22, Lei Yu a professor at Liaocheng University and Sophia Sui a research fellow at Deakin University, Korea observer vol. 53, issue 2, “Balancing between "Two Evils": US-China Competition and China's Strategy toward North Korea's Nuclear Issue”, 2022, (https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=8e63677c-3bec-4baa-a0de-80dbcdf12693%40redis)

The economic and military assistance provided by China since the demise of the former Soviet Union (the other most important ally of North Korea) has essentially sustained, if not survived, the Pyongyang regime. Consequently, a number of politicians, senior diplomats and scholars of international relations (IR) particularly in the West have gone to enormous lengths to persuade China to play a decisive role in containing Pyongyang's nuclear ambition by exerting on it economic, political and security pressure (Boyer & Miller 2017; Reuters 2017). China has to date displayed much reluctance in satisfying the request rendered primarily by the United States and its allies to place a comprehensive trade embargo on North Korea, let alone block its nuclear program by taking concrete measures in cooperation with the United States. As its largest trading partner, China accounts for more than 80% of North Korea's international trade and enjoys a large trade surplus (Denyer 2017). North Korea's economic interest will surely be hurt by a complete trade embargo and so will China's. But Pyongyang's nuclear program is jeopardizing regional peace and stability and, much worse, is likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia and result in a military intervention by the United States. Economic interest is more often than not described by academics of international relations (IR) as "low politics" whereas security, "high politics". Nonetheless, Chinese foreign policy-makers have to date adopted a strategy of a delicate balance between maintaining its economic relationship with Pyongyang and, to a limited extent, containing it nuclear ambition. As "a rational actor" in the international system, China's strategy indicates that there must be some significant motivations behind its delicate balance

#### 00s crises devastated US econ allowing east Asia to counterbalance US globalization

Rui 19, Ding Rui, Doctor of philosophy in political science university of Macau, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, “Facilitating or Hindering? US Hegemony and Regional Integration in East Asia 1990–2018”, 2019, (<https://www-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/2388066558?pq-origsite=primo>)

In 1990, conservative political columnist Charles Krauthammer claimed that a “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 1990) had arrived. The US, as the only superpower, clearly overlooked the rest of the world as the former Soviet Union collapsed, Japan fell into stagnation, and Europe was experiencing a difficult transaction period. After a short period, the US conducted a series of strategic propaganda based on the Washington Consensus to promote and enforce globalization, with the 1990s becoming the longest economic expansion in US history. However, during the 21 st century, with Europe successfully combining and expanding its economic map into an institution known as the European Union (EU), regional economic integration become a key feature that counter-balanced the influence of globalization. Furthermore, newly developing countries such as India, South Africa, Russia and, particularly, China rapidly merged into the global economy, claiming a significant share of the stake. On the other hand, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US found itself trapped in two wars against terrorism in the Middle East for more than a decade. These wars dramatically shifted the trajectory of the US’ politics, both domestically and internationally, and almost completely drained resources from the US economy. What made it worse for the US was the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, followed by the global financial crisis in 2008. These crises had a profound and devastating effect on the US with respect to its status as a super power and hegemon.

## Impact

### China - SCS

#### US military operations in the South China sea scare Chinese military

**Associated Press 21**, The Associated Press (AP) is an American non-profit news agency headquartered in New York City. Founded in 1846 "China says US increasing military activity directed at it," 4-30-2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/04/29/china-says-us-increasing-military-activity-directed-at-it/, 7-17-2022, AB

Activity by U.S. military ships and surveillance planes directed toward China has increased significantly under President Joe Biden’s administration, a spokesperson for the Chinese Defense Ministry said Thursday. As an example, Wu Qian said the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer Mustin had recently conducted close-in observation of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning and its battle group. That had “seriously interfered with the Chinese side’s training activities and seriously threatened the safety of navigation and personnel on both sides,” Wu said. The ship had been warned to leave and a formal protest filed with the U.S., he said. “Who wins when part of one force goes up against all of a hostile force? That’s the question we may see put to the test. The answer is far from obvious.” By Geoff Ziezulewicz Activity by U.S. military ships was up 20 percent and by planes 40 percent in areas China claims since Biden took office in January over the same period last year, Wu said. “The U.S. frequently dispatches ships and planes to operate in seas and airspace near China, promoting regional militarization and threatening regional peace and stability,” Wu said at a monthly briefing held virtually. China routinely objects to the U.S. military presence in the South China Sea, which it claims virtually in its entirety, as well as the passage of Navy ships through the Taiwan Strait. The country recently marked the 20th anniversary of the collision between a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese navy fighter near the Chinese island province of Hainan that resulted in the Chinese pilot’s death. He was called a hero who sacrificed himself for the defense of the motherland. The U.S. says its plane was in international airspace and the accident was the result of reckless flying by the Chinese side. Wu also blasted moves to beef up monitoring of Chinese aircraft movements by Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy claimed by China as its own territory to be annexed by force if necessary. Taiwan’s government to stave off what China refers to as inevitable unification are like “a mantis trying to stop a chariot,” Wu said. The U.S. maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan in deference to Beijing, but provides the island with defensive weapons and is legally bound to treat threats to it as matters of “grave concern.” Increased activity by the Chinese military around Taiwan has been raising concerns about the possibility of a conflict. In an interview with Britain’s Sky News, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry Joseph Wu reiterated recent warnings that the military threat from China is growing through “misinformation campaigns, hybrid warfare, and ... grey zone activities.” “And all these seem to be preparing for their final military assault against Taiwan,” Wu told Sky. “This is our country, this is our people and this is our way of life. We will defend ourselves to the very end,” Wu said. Biden did not address such military threats in his address to Congress on Wednesday night, instead emphasizing that China and others were “closing in fast” in economic and technological terms. “We’re in a competition with China and other countries to win the 21st century,” Biden said.

#### China war escalates

Hu Bo 20, Chinese novelist and film director "China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction," xx-xx-xxxx, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-china-sea-fact-and-fiction/, 7-17-2022, AB

No one doubts that the military competition and frictions are real and serious between China and the United States in the South China Sea, when they have rivalrous intentions, tit-for-tat strategies, and daily operational confrontations. China is accused of coercing U.S. allies and partners, militarizing disputed features, and seeking regional hegemony, and the United States is considered to be playing the South China Sea card and containing China’s rise as a maritime power. In the context of overall intensified strategic competition between the two countries, the South China Sea is even less likely to be an exception. But the question remains: how fierce will the competition be? When every day is filled with news of maritime standoffs between China and the United States, many may wonder, will China and the U.S. slip into military conflict? Both sides have reasons to maintain and expand their military presence in the South China Sea. China is the largest littoral state of the South China Sea, and has important interests at stake: territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional waters, and sea lanes of communication. With China’s military modernization, it is natural that more and more military platforms are active in the area. Meanwhile the United States thinks highly of maritime predominance, freedom of navigation, and security commitments to regional states. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the most powerful military presence and executed a variety of complex military operations in the South China Sea. For a long time after World War II, due to China’s weak naval and air forces, there were not many chances for Chinese and American military forces to encounter each other at sea. However, much has changed in the past decade. On the one hand, China’s capacity has rapidly increased, and the progress of the navy and air force is particularly impressive. On the other hand, the United States has grown increasingly worried about China’s rising power and significantly strengthened its naval and air presence since 2009. U.S. aircraft sorties increased by 100 percent to about 1,500, and surface ship presence increased by 60 percent to around 1,000 ship days per year. In this context, frequent military- to-military encounters are inevitable. The U.S. military is used to being unparalleled and unchallengeable in the South China Sea and is not ready to accommodate China’s maritime rise. Although the People’s Liberation Army is already very strong materially, it is still a novice spiritually and in the process of learning how to interact with its American counterparts as a mature power. But neither side seems to have much to offer other than peaceful coexistence. If both sides develop normally, in terms of power, the future of the South China Sea would be a bipolar region, regardless what kind of intentions they have. Moreover, most countries in the region are reluctant to take sides in the China-U.S. power competition. Therefore, it is hard for either side to re-establish a dominant order here. As the power distribution becomes more balanced, the idea of a managed military conflict is fanciful. One side’s provocation will inevitably invite the other’s retaliation, where spiral escalation is highly possible. Considering that both sides have so many weapon platforms and both are major nuclear powers, the feasibility of a military solution has greatly diminished. The China-U.S. rivalry in the South China Sea is certainly growing, but war is still some way off. There are several maritime encounters between the two sides every day, and thousands every year. Most of them are professional and safe; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation. Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. China feels that Washington’s South China Sea policy is increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten to provoke China. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants. From mid-April to early May, the U.S. Navy dispatched several warships, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella to deter China’s operations. The PLA Navy was believed to have a similar number of warships there at the same time, which aroused heated discussion among the media and experts. Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier. Even so, both sides have remained largely professional and restrained. In fact, neither the Chinese military nor the American military has increased its activity significantly compared with the same period of 2019, despite the impression given by most media reports and expert commentaries. The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. In the backdrop of power competition, especially amid the pandemic, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. forces have given undue prominence to covering and publicizing military activities, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market. China and the United States are, of course, preparing for any kind of military conflict and the worst scenarios in the South China Sea; however, there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve their contradictions by using force strategically or operationally — despite the repeated war rhetoric from some senior American officials. In daily military interactions, there are really increasing risks, but in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict, these risks are highly likely to be controlled. The most important thing for the Chinese and American militaries to prevent is miscalculation, considering the relatively backward or ineffective crisis management mechanisms of the two countries even compared with Soviet-U.S. and then Russia-U.S. military relations. In addition, we need to let professionals do their work. The China-U.S. military rivalry has been unduly influenced by the media, commentators, and some politicians, which amplifies the intensity of the competition and is likely to lead to self-fulfilling prophecies.

### China – Trade

#### The fight for hegemony is a threat to global peace: drives US-China trade conflict and creates military and political friction

**Kim 19 -** Min-hyung; Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea; “A real driver of US–China trade conflict,” 4 February 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited, <https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003>

According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. In other words, by allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. This is the theory of comparative advantage that underpins international trade. Putting up trade barriers makes it hard for people to access cheaper goods and raises the costs of living, thereby making everyone worst off in the long-run. Indeed, the efforts of the removal of trade barriers since the Second World War have driven the unprecedented world’s economic growth thus far. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? The trade war between the USA and China will also have negative consequences on the global economy since it will slow down the world’s economic growth, among others. What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The main goal of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the Sino–US trade war. In an effort to make sense of the trade war, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory (HST) and power transition theory (PTT). Its central thesis is that **“US fear” about its declining hegemony and** **China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with** **China.** Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the article contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers. As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the US–China competition for hegemony will intensify over time (Kim, 2016a). A s a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, **even if the trade** **war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later** **as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues.**

### Endless War

#### Continued US Hegemony will DESTROY the Country – Never Ending Wars

Samir Amin 2008 – Samir is a leading member of the Egyptian Socialist Party and a co-founder of the World Forum for Alternatives, “Beyond US Hegemony”, 7/7, Bloomsbury Academic

The overweening character of the US project means that it is bound to fail in the end, though at a terrible human cost. The resistance of its victims — the peoples of the South — will grow stronger as the Americans become bogged down in the many war fronts to which they are forced to commit themselves. The resistance will eventually defeat the enemy, and perhaps also awaken public opinion in the United States, as it did in the case of the Vietnam War. But it would be much better to halt the catastrophe sooner — which international diplomacy could succeed in doing, especially if Europe measured up to its responsibilities.

### Imperialism

#### US Hegemony Hold up Imperialism and is Inherently Bad

Joseph Choonara 2022 - Joseph Choonara teaches International Political Economy at King's College London. He is the author of Unravelling Capitalism: A Guide to Marxist Political Economy, a columnist for the magazine Socialist Review and an editorial board member of International Socialism journal, “The devastation of Ukraine: NATO, Russia and imperialism”, Research Gate

After the Second World War, the configuration of imperialism changed in important ways. Many of the former colonies were able to throw out their rulers, achieving formal independence, even if remaining in a subordinate position economically. Meanwhile, the US’s rulers, having emerged from the war with by far the most powerful economy—a status they maintained in the decades that followed—sought to create an imperialist order based not on colonies but on open markets. Powerful corporations, built around the US’s mass production industries, would possess major advantages in this arena. Meanwhile, the dollar would underpin the global financial system, again conferring advantages on the US. Finally, US military power would outstrip that of any potential rivals within the Western world.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies were excluded from the liberal market system, instead organizing their economies as more or less autarkic “bureaucratic state-capitalisms”, each functioning somewhat like a single giant enterprise, with the state bureaucracy directing production.

The formation of two competing blocs of capitalist powers, with the leading state in each armed with nuclear weapons, led to a “partial dissociation of economic and political power”. In the Western bloc, the Japanese and European economies were reconstructed, the latter increasingly integrated through the forerunners of the EU, under the political and military leadership of the US. Although there could be sharp economic tensions within this bloc, they did not result in military clashes.

The wars that erupted during the Cold War typically took the form of proxy conflicts, in which one or other of the superpowers might intervene directly, but in which both avoided a direct confrontation. The overall global order remained broadly fixed: “Both the US and the Soviet Union, at least in the period of détente in the 1960s and 1970s, were willing to regard themselves and each other as status quo powers with no interest in revisiting the post-war settlement”.

### Mid-East War

#### US leadership empirically brings death and creates power vacuums

Bandow 20 - Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties who worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, “The U.S. Should Not Lead the World”, 7/23/20, CATO Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-should-not-lead-world

After two decades of U.S. “leadership” in the Middle East, what is the result? A series of nations wrecked. New terrorist organizations created. Even more new enemies made. Thousands of Americans killed. Tens of thousands of U.S. personnel wounded. Hundreds of thousands of foreign civilians killed. Even more wounded. Millions of people displaced. Trillions of dollars squandered. Heckuva job, Washington! Let’s have some more American leadership. Yet even the slightest suggestion that the U.S. step back anywhere generates horrified, frenetic opposition. The president’s proposals to withdraw troops from countries as disparate as Afghanistan, Germany, Iraq, South Korea, and Syria triggered sustained bouts of wailing and gnashing of teeth in Washington and overseas. Not only must America lead, it must always lead, and once having led anywhere, it must forever lead everywhere. No retreats, substitutions, or transformations are allowed. This fixation on U.S. leadership amounts to a self‐​fulfilling prophecy. If nothing can be accomplished without America, then other nations will act as if nothing can be accomplished without America. Which means they will not act. And nothing will be accomplished without Washington.

#### US hegemony kills hundreds of thousands of people

Meisenhelder 20 – Thomas, retired Professor of Sociology from California State University, “Declining American Hegemony Could Be A Good Thing”, 10/11/20, Common Dreams, <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2020/10/11/declining-american-hegemony-could-be-good-thing>

Much of the U. S. hegemony has stemmed from the fact that the United States is surely the most heavily armed and most militarily active country in the world. The national myth is that we use military force reluctantly and only when it is necessary to insure human rights, peace, and security. But let’s look at the record: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Cuba, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Chile, Central America, Libya, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Panama, Afghanistan. Are any of these places were made better as a consequences of our covert and overt actions? We spend more on weapons of war than any other country in the world. Researchers at Brown University have found that since the horror of 9/11, the so-called “war on terrorism” has killed 800,000, displaced 37,000,000, and cost taxpayers $6.4 trillion.

## Alt

### China Rise---General

#### China is able to become the new global hegemon and is establishing ties with many US allies.

Ataman 21 – Muhittin, professor of political science at the Faculty of Political Science in the Department of International Relations at Social Sciences University of Ankara and PhD in political science, “Global leadership crisis: The U.S. hegemony vs. China”, 9/27/21, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/global-leadership-crisis-the-us-hegemony-vs-china

With its cutting-edge technology, economic growth, military power and huge population, China is the second most influential global actor after the U.S. On the one hand, China positions itself against Western hegemony. For this reason, it spearheaded the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is considered the new other of NATO. It has been preparing itself to introduce a new set of global rules in the near future. On the other hand, China has been trying to establish economic institutions as an alternative to the United Nations' specialized organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It is now ready to provide financial resources to other countries for different kinds of projects. It has hired or bought many seaports worldwide in order to solidify its position globally. It has begun to steal allies from the U.S. as well. Many countries that are close to the U.S., such as European countries and Israel, have begun to improve their relations with China. Many African and Middle Eastern countries consider China as one of their closest economic and political partners. Therefore, it can easily be assumed that the Chinese challenge for global hegemony is in the making. The only reason why China has not claimed global hegemony is timing. In other words, according to the Chinese leadership, China is not yet ready for global hegemony. When China begins to involve itself in the political and economic affairs of other countries and steer them away from the U.S., a global confrontation will become inevitable. At that time, the U.S. is not sure how many countries will continue to remain on its side. Many European countries may remain indifferent to a possible confrontation between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region. The position of some global powers such as India against Chinese global power is clear, while many others may remain neutral in case of increased confrontation. Although Russia seems closer to China and European countries seem closer to the U.S., their position may change over time. The position of many global and regional powers is not fixed. These states may swing between the two fronts.

#### Chinese hegemony is inevitable – increasing isolationism and decreasing global US influence opens a space for China to rise above the US

Roland 21 – Gerard, professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley, “China's rise and its implications for International Relations and Northeast Asia”, July 2021, ScienceDirect, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667111521000165

China's rise seems currently unstoppable, especially in light of the decline of the US and the West in general. While we are likely to see a continuation of these trends in coming years, China's rise will at some point reach its limits, given the intrinsic weaknesses we outlined in this article. Similarly, we will likely see further military retreat by the US. US isolationism is not a new phenomenon but took new forms under the Trump administration. Despite declarations of the Biden administration that “the US is back”, we will see a decrease in US presence abroad. The only countervailing factor will be demand for US presence by its allies. A big difference, however, between the Trump administration's policy and that of the Biden administration is that the former pursued a “go alone” policy, while the latter is pursuing a policy of strengthening its alliances with democratic countries. The rise of China and its increasing international assertiveness has led to a trade war under the Trump administration. Calls for decoupling from China may lead to a partial dismantling of globalization, which would be economically very hurtful. We can, however, not ignore the fact that China has been using other countries’ growing trade dependence on China as a political instrument in its strategy to create a system of tributary states. A possible solution in my view is to develop “political trade deals” under the auspices of the WTO. In such deals, countries would agree not to hold up each other in case of political frictions. To make such deals credible, there should be an agreed to system of sanctions in case of lack of respect of the trade deal by one of the parties. To make such a system of sanctions credible, countries participating in such deals would have to agree to deposit large sums of money with the WTO as a guarantee for possible future sanctions. Putting such a system in place is easier said than done and would require extensive multilateral negotiations and a restructuring of the current multilateral trade system as well as of the WTO. Whether the WTO is strong enough or the US-China tension is too strong to still make such a system possible is of course to be seen. It would nevertheless be preferrable to the current system of instability and the high risks of implosion of the international trade system as was the case in the 1930s.

#### No hegemon stays a hegemon forever – new countries naturally take the spot of old hegemons. This has happened for centuries; the present will be no different.

Lee and Zulkefli 21 – Pei and Nina, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia, “US-CHINA RELATIONS: TRADE WAR AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL HEGEMONY”, 12/30/21, Journal of International Studies, https://doi. org/10.32890/jis

The hegemon will rise and gradually die, just like any other being in the world, behaving in accordance with the natural order of the universe, to be replaced by an emerging power. Many great powers have risen to the top of the power hierarchy throughout history, including ancient Rome, Germany, and the United Kingdom. For a time, each was an indisputable hegemon, setting international rules and bending the international order to their own objectives, but, as with all other once-dominant powers, they too were forced to accept their predestined fate of fading away. It is said that the hegemon’s position is often at its most precarious when there is a new rising power that can pose a challenge to its hegemonic position. Such is the case with China’s rapid development in recent decades. Its high growth rates were startling, and over an extended period it continued to be one of the fastest-growing economies of the world. Therefore, it is not unexpected that its growth has made the leading power – the United States (US) – extremely uncomfortable. The rise of China is seen to threaten the US preponderance of power, which has eventually led to the US-China trade war. While there are numerous studies discussing the trade war, few have employed a theoretical approach. Therefore, this article intends to examine the dynamics of power relations between the US and China within and beyond the context of the US-China trade war from two approaches— power transition theory and soft power. We argue that China cannot unseat the position of the US as a global hegemon within the next decade. Using the example of the US-China trade war, this article also attempts to extend the explanatory potential of power transition theory by arguing that the outcome of a war initiated by a hegemon would likely be in its favour due to the hegemon’s ability to set and alter existing rules.

#### If China woke from its slumbers, it would astonish the world.

Chas W. **Freeman** Jr, 20**10** , USFS (https://mepc.org/speeches/chinas-challenge-american-hegemony)

Napoleon is said to have predicted that, when China woke from its slumbers, it would "astonish the world."  The Little Corporal was a loquacious fellow who got much wrong but he seems to have gotten this right. In a mere three decades, China has risen from impotence and backwardness to a leading position in global affairs. This year it will become the second biggest producer of goods and services, something projected just five years ago to happen only in 2020. China is clearly on the way to regaining its historic position as the world's largest economy, displacing the United States. (Given continued rapid growth in the Chinese economy, slow growth elsewhere, and progressive revaluation of the Renminbi Yuan, this could happen much sooner than many expect.) The prospect of transcendent Chinese wealth and power, coupled with America's devaluation of its own political and economic prestige, has led to mounting speculation about China's emergence as a global hegemon to rival and, perhaps in time, surpass the Uni ted States.

### China Rise---Transition

#### China overtaking US hegemony will be peaceful - China uses economic measures rather than war to achieve hegemony

Bader 21 – [Julia, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam with a MA in Politics and Management from Konstanz University and a PhD in Political Science from Heidelberg University, 7/21/21, “Undermining American Hegemony”, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/undermining-american-hegemony/china-and-the-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-undermining-hegemony-through-goods-substitution/5D854284BD4A85BF0E465BECAD8DC42A]

When Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, unexpectedly announced the UK’s intention to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in mid-March 2015, an unnerved US official could not hold back his concern ‘about a trend [in the UK] toward constant accommodation of China’ (Reference Watt, Lewis and BraniganWatt et al. 2015). This rare instance of rebuking a close partner in public, however, did not prevent other US allies from following the British example: in a domino-like manner other European states, Australia and South Korea followed suit. By March 2015, fifty-seven countries, including non-Asian and G7 states, had applied for membership of the AIIB (AIIB 2020). Since then, membership has grown to 102 members. China is increasingly ready and able to openly challenge the hegemonic position of the United States in international relations. Indeed, the academic debate about the rise of China in international relations has long shifted from discussing whether China will affect the existing international order to debating about how it will do so. That is, the early literature investigating the nature of China’s rise in terms of a status quo or revisionist orientation towards the existing international order (Reference JohnstonJohnston 2003; Reference LegroLegro 2007; Reference ChanChan 2008; Reference BuzanBuzan 2010; Reference Schweller and PuSchweller and Pu 2011; Reference Kastner and SaundersKastner and Saunders 2012; Reference Wuthnow, Xin and LinglingWuthnow, et al. 2012) is being complemented by examinations of how China uses its economic cloud to effectively influence the policy preferences of others in order to protect its own (foreign) policy interests (Reference Flores-Macías and KrepsFlores-Macías and Kreps 2013; Reference Fuchs and KlannFuchs and Klann 2013; Reference KastnerKastner 2014; Reference StrüverStrüver 2017; Reference BaderBader 2019). Yet, the role that China has started to take on in the new millennium goes much further than employing economic statecraft in its bilateral relations (Reference Medeiros and FravelMedeiros and Fravel 2003; Reference EconomyEconomy 2010). China now sees the UN ‘as one of the key venues in which to demonstrate its responsible Great Power status and its willingness to provide global public goods’ so as to gain legitimacy at home and abroad (Reference FootFoot 2014:1088).Footnote1 Outside of the UN, Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative signals the readiness for leadership of the kind that ‘America has not shown since the post-war days of the Marshall Plan’ (The Economist 2017). More generally, experts have noted a trend in China’s foreign policy towards ‘re-engineering’ – or ‘shadow diplomacy’ as some have called it – which involves the construction of new, supplementary international platforms and institutions (Reference Heilmann, Rudolf, Huotari and BuckowHeilmann et al. 2014; Reference WesleyWesley 2015). The AIIB is a prime example thereof. To make sense of China’s recent power-political manoeuvres, this chapter builds on the concept of goods substitution and on the categorisation of orientation towards the international system as introduced in the earlier chapters of this book. While I am not intending to reduce the establishment of the AIIB to power-political considerations, I argue that the AIIB was initiated as a counter-hegemonic attempt targeted at the architecture of international finance and at US dominance therein. The initiative’s effects in terms of deconcentrating power were only limited. But, while largely conforming to the norms and standards of existing international financial institutions (IFIs) and development banks, China was successful in making all founding members subscribe to the principles of non-conditionality and non-interference, which largely deviate from current practices in development finance. The AIIB serves well as an illustrative case of goods substitution. It was seen primarily as a power-political maneuver by policy-makers in the United States who feared that the AIIB would undermine governance conditionality – and hence political influence in lending countries – in the short-term, and hollow out US supremacy in global finance in the long run (Reference Callaghan and HubbardCallaghan and Hubbard 2016). Hence, US opposition and its attempts to prevent others from joining the Chinese initiative. In addition, the case of the AIIB sheds light on the demand-side dynamics of goods substitution and illustrates how opportunistic hedging and uncoordinated herding by third states may inadvertently undermine the existing order. The chapter starts by placing the AIIB initiative in the context of the existing international arrangements which the AIIB sought to substitute. Then, I develop the argument that the AIIB – initially thought of as a revisionist counter-hegemonic initiative – transformed into an integrated part of the existing international financial architecture due to the engagement of Western third states. I conclude by arguing that goods substitution as an analytical lens may advance the study of international relations by placing the mechanisms of power politics at the centre of inquiry, being less obsessed with traditional security concerns and, most importantly, attributing more agency to non-hegemonic actors.

#### A decline in US hegemony leads to a more stable bilateral or multilateral international order led by China

Aslan 21 – Dr. Alli, Associate professor at the Political Science and International Relations Department of Ibn Haldun University, 8/31/21, “ANALYSIS - The falling trend of US’s global leadership role”, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-the-falling-trend-of-us-s-global-leadership-role/2351335#

Firstly, developments at the regional level may become more impactful compared to those at the global level in determining international outcomes, as a result of the US’s decline. This process has been in place for some time already. Regional dynamics have become more decisive in international politics as a result of the dominance of unipolarity and, thus, the global power struggle falling off the agenda. Conditions that would compel secondary states or regional powers to sit on the US’s tail in the context of global campaigns no longer exist. Despite all its efforts, the US has failed to unite countries against a common enemy. It wasn’t able to create a common enemy. Global politics was more effective in determining regional politics in the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar, US-led world of the following 10-15 years. However, starting in the mid-2000s, regional dynamics began to be more decisive in the foreign policy of countries. The influence of global dynamics on international politics has decreased. For instance, the conflicts and institutionalization in regions such as the Far East, South Asia, Latin America, South Africa, and the Middle East have started becoming determined by the dynamics of the regions themselves, rather than by global dynamics. It wouldn’t be surprising to see this process reach the point where the regional level is determining the global level. In the not-too-distant future, the international order determined by US unipolarity may be replaced by a multipolar international order in which regional balances form the poles. Second of all, the significance of the regional level is embodied in the rise of China. China has gradually evolved into a regional hegemon in the last 50 years. The next step for China is to transform from a regional power to a global one. The US-centered unipolar and liberal international order is the biggest obstacle to China’s growth initiative. Today, we see that this struggle is continued through the diplomatic tensions between the two countries. The prolongation of the downward trend of the US and its withdrawal from certain regions will cause China to increase its sphere of influence. We see that China is approaching Afghanistan without wasting any time. Moreover, we also see that it’s intimidating the Asian countries that are trying to surround it, led by the US. Any bit of space withdrawn from by the US is a potential area of expansion for China. This process of expansion will gradually transform China from a regional power to a global one. It’s becoming more and more clear that the US can’t stop China. However, it’s also not so easy to say that China’s path is clear of obstacles. Bigger obstacles await China, other than the US. In the long run, other regional powers are more likely to be the biggest obstacle to China’s claim to global power. The future superpower candidate China may have to share the current superpower’s bitter fate as well. Thirdly, the global leadership role of the US will become more and more questionable. It’s natural for states to prioritize their own interests and act accordingly. In addition, it’s also a fact of international politics that states establish alliance relations with each other. Therefore, states must strike a healthy balance between protecting their own interests and coming together with other states. And, this becomes even more important in the hierarchical relations between a strong state and a secondary or weak state (or actors). When it comes to trust, secondary and small states are more sensitive, due to the power asymmetry. The great power losing its credibility causes brute-force calculations to form the basis of the relations. Therefore, the authority of the great power is undermined and its superiority is not seen as legitimate. This leads to the leadership of the great power being questioned further by the secondary and small states. Perhaps the US’s loss of soft power in international politics in the last 20 years and the gradual erosion of trust in its leadership is more important than the decline in its material capacities in recent years. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan may be a breaking point in this process. In fact, the thesis that Trump’s US, which turned its back on its allies, was an anomaly and that the US, with Joe Biden, is now standing by its allies once again has suffered a great wound with the events in Afghanistan. The idea that the US will easily leave an ally to its fate, regardless of who becomes president, is gaining ground. Fourthly, the Taliban’s victory may encourage violent groups in other regions. The Taliban quickly lost power following the 2001 invasion. It was out of the question for them to make a stand against an enormous power like the US. However, the material power of the US was not enough to establish an alternative power structure to the Taliban in the country. Obtaining military victory over small states or organizations is easy, but political victory difficult. Because, the institutional structure forms naturally in the historical process and gains legitimacy gradually. It’s nearly impossible to build an institutional structure while accelerating the process with outside interventions. The structure can't be seen as legitimate or comprehensive. The alternative to establishing an institutional structure is centralizing the power around individuals. In this case, corruption and instability would be inevitable. This is what happened in Afghanistan; initially with the government of Hamid Karzai and then with that of Ashraf Ghani. When the US understood that the first option was impossible, it went with the second one. The difficulty of obtaining political victories clearly demonstrates that time runs in favor of organizations like the Taliban. It reveals that there is opportunity for terrorist and violent organizations in societies damaged by outside interventions. This situation whets the appetite of such organizations. The clear application and validation of the theory in Afghanistan will encourage violent groups elsewhere. This, in turn, could lead to the US’s control over international politics to diminish further. Finally, leaving Afghanistan to the mercy of the Taliban will result in the credibility of the US’s democracy transfer policy hitting rock bottom and realism gaining strength against liberalism. We mustn’t forget that liberalism played an important role in the long-term survival of the US’s global supremacy. Liberalism has served many functions, from legitimizing intervening in the internal affairs of countries, to establishing an international institutional structure (or order) that would maintain the superior position of the US at minimum cost. The US withdrawing and abandoning countries to their own fates would lead to a more deeply ingrained realist world. As one would remember, during the presidency of Trump, the US had built its grand strategy on the acceptance of the realist world and acting in accordance with this new reality. It had given up on the carrying out of military interventions in other countries for regime changes or humanitarian purposes and the managing of international politics through multilateral institutional structures. And, this indicates the emergence of a world where states are left on their own, uncertainty increases, and the use of force is legitimized and widespread. The leadership of a single country in such a world is beyond consideration. And, the acceptance of a realist world would mean that the US has given up on leading the world. Even before he took office, Biden had stated that the US would be “back in the game”, that is, he would follow a foreign policy in which the US would once more assume the leadership role. He also carried on with his statements and actions in this regard after taking office. However, he must have realized that this liberal foreign policy perspective couldn’t be sustained that he recently started to follow a more realistic foreign policy, which also shows that Trump’s foreign policy decisions were not due to his own personal quirks but the structural imperatives and conditions faced. His decision to withdraw from Afghanistan should also be considered in this context. In conclusion, many indicators show that the US is in an unstoppable decline. This decline is, naturally, limited to the US losing its current global leadership role. With its huge resources, geographical advantage, and solid institutional structure, the US will continue to be an important force in international politics. The biggest challenge of the US in the medium and long term will be how quickly and how well it adapts to its new position. Adapting to international politics without the US will also be a significant challenge for other countries.

#### China overtaking the US in global leadership won’t cause a great power war

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One of the contemporary issues in international relations is that the current hegemon, the United States, has undergone a relative decline. It is argued that American hegemony that emerged aftermath the Second World War is undergoing a decline and with the rise of a potential challenger in China looming, one major issue concerning IR scholars is whether or not the relative decline of US hegemony will result in a hegemonic war. Hegemonic wars occur when a rising challenger – revisionist power – isn’t content with the current international order and wants to change it so as to become a preponderant force and dictate terms of a new world order. This article assumes that although the US is in a relative decline it is still a dominant power and the rising power is content with the current status quo so no war occurs between the dominant and the rising power. In order to support the argument that a hegemonic war does not occur, this article provides explanation using several theoretical perspectives. To begin with, prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz contends that the end of the Cold War has changed the structure of international politics from bipolar to unipolar with the US being the dominant power. According to Waltz, days of US being unipolar force in world politics is numbered and slowly the world is moving towards bipolarity or multipolarity because changes in the structure of international system brings about changes in state behavior. It does not matter how much self-restraint and self-control a preponderant power is in its conduct of international relations; states are always wary and fear the dominant power and thus he maintains that balancing is universal. [1] In order to explain why, he has resorted to the Balance of Power (theory). In most basic sense, international politics is a state of anarchy where there is no central government and states rely on themselves to protect their autonomy and perpetuate their survival. Balance of Power contends that states involve in a balancing act to check the powers of preponderant force so that no any single state has enough power to become a global hegemon. [2] With the relative decline of US, China and America can enter into bipolar relationship much like the US and the USSR during the Cold War. Since Waltz himself posits bipolarity as the most stable of international configurations, it can be argued that act of balancing between the US and China brings the international distribution of power into an equilibrium and averts the risk of war. Socialization of Hegemonic Power Most scholars posit that hegemons use threats and rewards to get compliance from secondary states. Contrary to popular wisdom, scholars Ikenberry and Kupchan have contended that in addition to material power, hegemons also have the power of socialization to achieve compliance from secondary states. They call this the socialization process which involves ‘altering of the belief systems’ of elites. Basically, hegemons project their vision of international order through normative principles (norms and values) and not by material incentives; elites in secondary states internalize them, and devise policies that are compatible to the hegemon’s ideal of the international order. The authors contend that the world order thus created can sustain even when hegemon undergoes a decline because the world order created is relatively inexpensive to maintain in the sense that altering of states preferences are by virtue of ideals rather than use of coercion. Thus, by virtue of socialization of hegemonic power, relative changes in hegemon’s distribution of material power (military and economy) does not put strain on the international system. So, on viewing the world from the lens of socialization, it can be argued that the expansion of US normative principles on liberal economic norm to its former allies and enemies aftermath the second world war that led to the formation of the current liberal economic world order provides an explanation as to why in spite of US’ relative decline there is continuity for America’s liberal economic order. [3] The rising challenger China can be considered to have been socialized – it has accepted US led international norms, and participates in various International Organizations. Thus, it makes less sense for China to wage war against the hegemon whose ideals it has internalized. Hegemonic Stability Theory According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system. The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. [4] By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted.

### Dissolution

#### The NATO Summit in Madrid is increasing US-China Tensions acting in the direct opposite of Europe’s interest. The alternative is to create a global peace movement and to push for the dissolution of military alliances freeing up resources to solve climate change and poverty.

Achkar 22, [Gilbert, Gilbert Achcar is a professor at SOAS, University of London, “NATO From Bad to Worse”, June 23 2022, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/] //adhi

From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June. From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow. These developments bring the world closer to a conflagration that could dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine and endanger the future of humankind. It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.

# Heg Good

## UQ

### UQ - Heg Sustainable

#### The US is in the PERFECT spot to maintain its hegemony for the years to come.

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The ideal geography for growth is one with abundant natural resources, transport infrastructure, and buffers from enemies. The ideal government is one that is capable yet accountable, meaning that it is strong enough to provide services and maintain order, but sufficiently divided to prevent corruption and the violation of private property rights. Finally, the ideal population is large, young, and educated. After presenting the evidence linking these factors to economic growth, I use indicators of each to assess the future prospects of the eight most powerful countries: the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and India. I find that the United States has, by far, the best growth fundamentals. Geographically, the United States is a natural economic hub and military fortress. It has enormous stocks of natural resources, more natural transport infrastructure than the rest of the world combined, and is surrounded by “friends and fish” (Canada, Mexico, and two huge oceans) whereas all the other major powers border powerful rivals. Institutionally, the United States is so-so. The small and divided U.S. government does a poor job redistributing wealth, but it fosters entrepreneurship and innovation; spurs reform after policy blunders; and helps the United States suck up investment, technology, and human capital from other nations. Demographically, the United States has the most productive population, and its working-age population is set to grow during this century, unlike the populations of its competitors. Potential challengers each have several weaknesses. China, the only country that is anywhere close to challenging U.S. primacy, has especially dismal growth prospects. In the coming decades, China will lose a third of its workforce and age faster than any society in history, with the ratio of workers to retirees shrinking from 8-to-1 today to 2-to-1 by 2050; its institutions fuel corruption, stifle entrepreneurship, and stymie reform after policy mistakes; its natural resources have dwindled due to overuse.

#### U.S. hegemony is strong and will stay so—their authors exaggerate the effects of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan and over-estimate China’s potential to rise.

Salvatore **Babones 15** Salvatore Babones is an adjunct scholar at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, Australia, and an associate professor at the University of Sydney, 6/11/15, “American Hegemony Is Here to Stay”

IS RETREAT from global hegemony in America’s national interest? No idea has percolated more widely over the past decade—and none is more bogus. The United States is not headed for the skids and there is no reason it should be. The truth is that America can and should seek to remain the world’s top dog. The idea of American hegemony is as old as Benjamin Franklin, but has its practical roots in World War II. The United States emerged from that war as the dominant economic, political and technological power. The only major combatant to avoid serious damage to its infrastructure, its housing stock or its demographic profile, the United States ended the war with the greatest naval order of battle ever seen in the history of the world. It became the postwar home of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And, of course, the United States had the bomb. America was, in every sense of the word, a hegemon. “Hegemony” is a word used by social scientists to describe leadership within a system of competing states. The Greek historian Thucydides used the term to characterize the position of Athens in the Greek world in the middle of the fifth century BC. Athens had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean; it was the home of Socrates and Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus; it crowned its central Acropolis with the solid-marble temple to Athena known to history as the Parthenon. Athens had a powerful rival in Sparta, but no one doubted that Athens was the hegemon of the time until Sparta defeated it in a bitter twenty-seven-year war. America’s only global rival in the twentieth century was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union never produced more than about half of America’s total national output. Its nominal allies in Eastern Europe were in fact restive occupied countries, as were many of its constituent republics. Its client states overseas were at best partners of convenience, and at worst expensive drains on its limited resources. The Soviet Union had the power to resist American hegemony, but not to displace it. It had the bomb and an impressive space program, but little else. When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This “unipolar moment” lasted a mere decade. September 11, 2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American leadership. Now, America’s internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, American hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated. America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers’ wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. By comparison, America’s current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that “if current policies remain in place, the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the implications of maintaining surpluses.” As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one financial crisis later, America’s budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America’s fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain’s was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America’s century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training. Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military. On the contrary, it may enhance it. America’s limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain’s bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922. Ultimately, it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade. But how long is the long run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. American hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh. WHEN PUNDITS scope out the imminent threats to U.S. hegemony, the one country on their radar screens is China. While the former Soviet Union never reached above 45 percent of U.S. total national income, the Chinese economy may already have overtaken the American economy, and if not it certainly will soon. If sheer economic size is the foundation of political and military power, China is positioned for future global hegemony. Will it build on this foundation? Can it? Much depends on the future of China’s relationships with its neighbors. China lives in a tough neighborhood. It faces major middle-tier powers on three sides: Russia to the north, South Korea and Japan to the east, and Vietnam and India to the south. To the west it faces a series of weak and failing states, but that may be more of a burden than a blessing: China’s own western regions are also sites of persistent instability. It is perhaps realistic to imagine China seeking to expand to the north at the expense of Russia and Mongolia. Ethnic Russians are abandoning Siberia and the Pacific coast in droves, and strategic areas along Russia’s border with China have been demographically and economically overwhelmed by Chinese immigration. Twenty-second-century Russia may find it difficult to hold the Far East against China. But that is not a serious threat to U.S. hegemony. If anything, increasing Sino-Russian tensions may reinforce U.S. global hegemony, much as Sino-Soviet tensions did in the 1970s.

#### China won’t have the ability to counter US heg anytime soon

Sawant ’21, Mangesh Sawant, Managing Partner and CEO, Quantico Consulting (Global Security, Homeland Security, Geopolitical Risks, Military Studies and International Security), December 13th 2021, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy”, Journal of Indo-pacific affairs, (https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870650/why-china-cannot-challenge-the-us-military-primacy/)

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power in 2020 in the fifth place behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh in the world, due to its lack of fourth-generation fighter planes and high-end drones. In General Shaozhong’s view, China will become the second-largest military power in the world only in 2049, when it celebrates its centennial anniversary.27 The US Military as an Economic Deterrent The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence. The Communist Party of China (CCP) gains its legitimacy from economic development. It is possible that China could target Guam with its small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). However, the use of ICBMs will lead to massive retaliatory strikes by the United States leading to total annihilation of China’s military and economic centers of gravity.28 The USN Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai, obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours. The CCP leadership is inexperienced in nuclear matters as it lacks exposure to a nuclear warfare strategy as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear policy is based on low-level deterrence, “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains small and vulnerable.29 Threatening the United States with 200 nuclear weapons is not an option. Geographically, the United States and China are similar in size. However, China’s economy will be decimated by a few US nuclear weapons, as its critical infrastructure is concentrated on the coastlines and not dispersed like the US infrastructure. A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worth USD 310 billion. The war will result in a decline in industrial production, unemployment, and inflation, causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution. As seen from World War II, the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war, resulting in high employment and industrial growth. It is expensive to be a superpower. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War two and a half millennia ago, “first count the cost.”30 China’s defense budget cannot compete with the combined power of United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States alone spends more on national defense than China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil combined.31 Can China afford it? An arms race will lead to an increase in China’s military spending, affecting its development goals. The Absence of War-fighting Experience The United States has an analytical learning process in place—China does not.32 Lessons learned have been well documented by the US military in the form of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The US military has been documenting lessons learned since as early as the Boxer Revolution during the China campaign.33 The US military has been led by outstanding military generals like George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and David Petraeus, while China always lacked great generals. The world sends its military officers to US military institutions and not China’s military colleges. The PLA strategy is based on Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception. China’s only option is an asymmetric strategy due to its incapability to fight symmetric wars. Chinese scholars have authored books like Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.34 However, China is unable to convert the strategies and tactics mentioned in these books into an executable doctrine. The Lack of Power Projection Power projection capabilities set a superpower apart. From its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been wielding its economic power to compel US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to align with China, which has not been greatly successful.35 China lacks global reach, as it does not have foreign defense treaties or logistical bases abroad equipped with military stockpiles.36 During a war with the United States, soliciting Pakistan’s military support looks difficult, as China’s all-weather friend has been hesitant to cut its military ties with the United States. China is constrained to operate beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled. China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support two to three ships for approximately two weeks.37 The USN’s 68 nuclear-powered submarines have been prowling the world’s oceans displaying naval power, while the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines are unable to do so. Fighter aircraft operating without a package of air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields cannot travel very far. The PLAAF’s capability to target US bases in the Pacific is hindered by a lack of air-refueling capacity. A flight group of eight J-11B Flankers will have to be simultaneously refueled twice by two air-refueling tankers for a seven-hour flight.38 The PLAAF will have to deploy 20 percent of its tanker fleet to refuel the Flankers. The PLAAF has 10 tankers for more than a thousand fighter aircraft, while the USAF has 625 tankers for 1,956 fighter aircraft.39 The tankers will be the prime targets for the USN potentially putting the Flankers at risk. China’s only existing bomber, the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii—even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases, as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers, as they cannot match its range.40 An Archaic Military Less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces, air force, and air defense forces and 55 percent of its submarine fleet were modern in 2011.41. Subsequently, nothing much has changed, as a substantial percentage of China’s military remains obsolete.42 China’s military faces institutional shortcomings arising from obsolete command structures, low quality of personnel, and corruption.43 The military has weaknesses centering on supporting capabilities such as logistics, inadequate airlift, and deficient air defense and antisubmarine warfare.44 The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence.45 China’s military training and operational capabilities and competences do not match US standards.46 PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations.47 China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges,48 as it emphasizes control above command.49 A culture of risk aversion and low levels of trust in subordinates impacts the PLA effectiveness.50 A highly centralized structure does not allow the PLAN to operate autonomously during a war. Therefore, a political commissar is positioned on PLAN warships and submarines.51 The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea.52 Nation states cannot project power globally through a rigid command-and-control system.53 PLAN submarines have the worst safety record in the world.54 The PLAN’s rudimentary nuclear missile submarine fleet carries a limited number of missiles.55 The PLAN cannot threaten the US mainland, as its submarines will have to sail through chokepoints such as the Kuriles and the Ryukyus islands, Luzon Strait, Taiwan Strait, and the Philippine archipelago—all of which are controlled by the USN.56 These chokepoints, forming a crescent-shaped chain, are also a defensive line for US containment policy; and the United States is involved in monitoring them. The PLAN submarine power is outdated, compared to the overwhelming USN undersea warfare capabilities. The US submarine arm brings strategic deterrence to the Indo-Pacific through a wide array of capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare antisurface warfare precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and special warfare capabilities. Soviet weapon systems were much sought after by the United States to learn their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft defected during the Cold War. An Iraqi MiG 21 defected to Israel, while a Soviet MiG 25 landed in Japan. The aircraft were later handed over to the United States to decipher the technical details. However, US intelligence is not similarly orchestrating any defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, as the United States is not interested in obsolete Chinese technology. Instead, China is stealing weapon data or reverse engineering US weapon systems.57 The CCP-controlled military press described the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter aircraft as a “flopping fish” and criticized it for lacking the stealth capabilities of the F-35 Lightning.58 The US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat during the First Gulf War, while the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft have been deployed in conflict zones. However, the PLAAF has not operationally inducted the J-31 fighter aircraft while the J-20 fighter aircraft has not yet proven its capabilities in any bilateral or multilateral military exercise. The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft. China’s Vulnerable A2/AD Zones A study of modern wars suggests that the United States will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone. This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations. The United States has a devastating array of lethal weapon systems, such as submarines, for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks, which destroyed the Iraqi military.59 Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland. Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military. The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam. The USN and USAF have signed a USD 414 million contract for autonomously guided with onboard sensors, jam-resistant, and difficult to detect antiship LRASM.60 The stealthy Zumwalt-class warship—equipped with emerging technologies—can sail undetected in littoral waters and contested territories to launch LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles. China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems, as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.61 During a war, the bases will be annihilated by the USN as the PLA cannot hide behind hills and forests. Once destroyed, these facilities cannot be supported from the mainland, as the logistical supplies will be demolished by the USN. China’s military modernization may enhance A2/AD zones, but it does not contribute to a blue-water, sea-control capability.62 China’s Hyped DF-21 Missile The antiship DF-21 missile, carried by colossal transporter erector launchers, has a range of 1,400 miles. The missile regiments are based in the barren Gobi Desert, which makes it an easy target for the US military. The DF-21 has been tested on a stationary ship, but it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target.63 A system of systems is required to track the AC,64 acquire the precise location, keep the missile locked on the target, penetrate the carrier’s multilayered defenses, and provide mid-course updates as within one hour the ship will have moved 30 miles. China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures.65 The United States and Russia have not yet developed a missile equivalent to the DF-21. However, China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range. China does not release the missile testing data, leading to many questions, including whether it can hit moving targets. Does it have precision targeting technologies?66 Until proven otherwise, the functionality of the missile is based on nothing but circumstantial inference and speculation. Opium War: Then and Now—Nothing Much Has Changed One can draw some historical parallels. For example, similarities exist between the unprepared Qing military during the Opium Wars and the contemporary PLA, which underestimates the US military.67 The Opium Wars were fought between the obsolete Qing military and an industrializing and a technologically advanced Britain, which possessed the world’s most-powerful navy.68 The British consisted of 20,000 troops and three dozen modern Royal Navy warships. While China maintained an 800,000 strong military force, only 35 percent of these forces were equipped with firearms.69 China had several A2/AD advantages, including strategic depth, numerical advantage, familiarity with battle terrain, and excellent coastal defenses.70 But, much like today's PLA, the Qing troops lacked combat experience. In contrast, the British troops were battle hardened and highly disciplined because of their involvement in various wars in the Middle East and Asia.71 The Qing’s archaic military system made it difficult to deploy troops to counter the mobile British forces.72 China’s generals, such as Yi Shan and Yang Fang, were incompetent in the pivotal Battle of Canton in 1841, resulting in a defeat for China.73 The Opium Wars have military parallels for the PLA. The wars led to the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the decimation of China’s military. The outcome of a contemporary war with the United States will be nearly identical to the political dimensions of the Opium Wars. The Tianjin Treaty of 1858, imposed by foreign powers, devastated China. Russia did not intervene but pressured China to cede a large part of its northeastern territory, including Vladivostok.74 The consequences of the Opium Wars led to the Boxer Rebellion in 1899. About 80 years later, the Japanese invasion of 1937 demonstrated how vulnerable and weak China was to external naval powers.

### UQ – Heg Sustainable – East Asia

#### US hegemony is maintained in Asia through the United Nations Command

Ban 20 – Kil Joo, Ph. D in Political Science from Arizona State University, “The two-for-one entity and a ‘for whom’ puzzle: UNC as both a peace driver and the US hegemony keeper in Asia”, 9/1/20, Asian Journal of Political Science,https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1080/02185377.2020.1814364

Offensive realists believe that cooperation is really difficult in international politics. Thus, a hegemon might be necessary for international stability from the perspective of hegemonic stability theorists. By contrast, neoliberal institutionalists believe that regimes make cooperation possible without a hegemon. Interestingly enough, the UNC plays a bridging role in filling the gap between the two groups of thought. The UNC as a multinational entity provides the US, a hegemon, with an opportunity to cooperate with other actors. To put it another way, the UNC has characteristics of both a hegemon and regime. The US-led UNC allows cooperation to be more likely by multinational actors’ compliance with the regime rules, not by hegemony-led enforcement. The UNC’s primary task has been to make the Korean Peninsula stable by maintaining the armistice and this will continue to be its mission in the future as well. Simultaneously, the UNC leaves the US as the greatest beneficiary of its existence, in terms of hegemony maintenance. The UNC as an international entity gives the US political, military, economic and institutional leverage over the other actors on the Korean Peninsula. Political leverage is when one state makes other states do what it wants and when it is able to command them. The UNC offers a consolidated legitimacy to oversee the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula (Salmon, 2019). The UNC also provides the US with the leverage to command the 16 Sending States who comprise the UNC because only the US general is authorized to assume the responsibilities of the UNC Commander (CDR). The CDR’s position leaves the US as a dominant voice in security and diplomatic arrangement in the region. The UNSCR 84 clearly establishes the UNC as ‘a unified command under the United States’ (The United Nations homepage). No other states can challenge the US’s authorization unless the U.N. changes it. Although the 16 states who comprise the UNC are able to express their opinion, the only person in charge who makes a final decision is the US general. Thus, the US’s opinion, hierarchically, takes priority over the others. Likewise, although policies are developed and decided under the name of the UNC, the US-preferred ones seem most likely to be espoused. The liaison officers from the sixteen Sending States play their role for peace on the Korean Peninsula under the organization of the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC). They participate in the theater-level exercises with the CFC to coordinate with the dispatch of military assets in the event of war. Interestingly enough, the MNCC is with the U-3, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Operations, of the UNC and it has been bolstered to work more closely with the UNC since 2015 (Creamer, 2017, p. 19). Since the U-3 is just one of the staffs of the UNC CDR, the US technically is presumed to have an influence on them. Seen in this light, the US as the commander is able to ‘integrate international support’ by effectively using a legal international entity (Creamer, 2017, p. 25). The US as the UNC CDR has the right to implement personnel management for other states. In 2018, the US designated a non-American general to assume the duties as the UNC Deputy Commander (DCR) for the first time since 1950. On 30 July 2018, Canadian Lieutenant General Wayne D. Eyre took office as the UNC DCDR as part of the effort to revitalize the UNC (Song, 2018, July 30). Then in 2019, the US named Australian Vice Admiral Stuart Mayer as the UNC DCDR to replace Lieutenant General Eyre (Yi, 2019). All of the designations could be fully interpreted as the US exercising its political clout to control the actions of member states of the UNC. The existence of the US-led UNC allows the US to play a leading role in international meetings. On January 16, 2018, the US and Canada co-hosted an international meeting for foreign ministers and representatives of 20 countries in Vancouver (US Embassy & Consulate in Korea Homepage). This meeting was officially billed as the ‘Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula’ aimed at dealing with North Korea’s denuclearization. All of the foreign ministers except for India’s were affiliated with the UNC (Creamer, 2017, p. 21). Two insights stand out from this meeting. First, the very existence of the UNC allowed this ministerial-level diplomatic meeting to be made. Thus, this meeting showed how influential the UNC as an international entity is to the world. Second, since the US takes a leading position in the UNC, the US looked eligible for this meeting as a co-host. In this vein, the UNC helped the US hegemony be viewed as a benevolent one. Similarly, the UNC entitles the US general to convene multinational meetings in South Korea. The most viable example is the Ambassador Roundtable. The US four-star general in the name of the UNC CDR calls monthly meetings by inviting ambassadors from the 16 UNC member states plus some states invited by the UNC commander. Two generals from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) countries are also invited and key staff members attend the meeting. The Ambassador Roundtable clearly shows how influential the US hegemony is in the region using the tool of the UNC. The US general as a host is seated in the centre with ambassadors seated around him. The UNC CDR makes opening statements and then gives them his thoughts about military situations and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. The ambassadors from member and invited states are eager to listen to him because the US general as the UNC CDR has significant power and responsibility. At the end of the meeting, the UNC CDR again as a host, makes closing remarks. There is no other place in the world that a military general is able to invite high ranking diplomats and convene this kind of meeting. A meeting arrangement seems closer to military–civil relations on an international level, not civil–military relations. In a nutshell, this kind of meeting itself based on the regime of the UNC makes the US wield wider political clout to all member states and the NNSC countries. The NNSC is technically an independent organization from the UNC.1 Since both organizations are aimed at maintaining the Korean Armistice, however, they work together in many ways. For instance, the NNSC team also joins in the UNCMAC-led SIT. Furthermore, the UNC CDR hosts the Change of Responsibility ceremonies for NNSC members. On 30 May 2019, the UNC CDR, the US General Abrams hosted the ceremony for incoming NNSC Swedish Member, Major General Corneliusson at the US base, Camp Humphreys (dvids, 2019). This is a clear example showing how close these two organizations are to each other, meaning the US has political clout over NNSC countries as well, namely Sweden and Switzerland. Inherently, the UNC is a multinational entity and thus all affiliated states together manage the regime. However, there exists a hierarchy in this organization because the US is exclusively able to take the command position. Thus, although the UNC, not the US, authorizes the DMZ access of certain personnel, the most influential player within this organization is the US, which alone decides who is allowed to enter into DMZ. The DMZ belongs to South Korea’s territory. South Korea, however, does not have the right to authorize the DMZ access although the UNC does. Meanwhile, as more people want to enter into the DMZ, the US’s influence becomes greater. The DMZ has been at the core of the talks toward North Korea’s denuclearization, particularly in 2018 and 2019. As a result, a number of people outside of the Korean Peninsula rushed to join the DMZ tour. Although there is a regulation on who is eligible to gain access, it cannot provide guidance for all situations. Thus, somebody needs to decide whether they are allowed to enter into the DMZ or not. Since the US general takes command of the UNC and US personnel to take the key positions, the US enjoys privileges to decide who is permitted. In June 2019, Seoul invited Germany’s governmental officials to learn lessons from their unification process JTBC News (2019, September 17)., South Korea’s news outlet, reported that the UNC did not authorize their access to the DMZ for safety reasons. The fact that one state has exclusive rights to give permission to access the area, particularly at the centre of political gravity, under the pretext of the internationally recognized regime, could be sufficiently interpreted as that it is armed with political leverage. By the same token, an initiative proposed even by a host nation would be impossible without the UNC’s authorization in a situation where the proposal is related to its area of responsibility. In September 2019, Seoul laid out the initiative to transform the DMZ into an ‘international peace zone’, which has been announced for the first time at the UN (UN News, 2019). International support matters to make this initiative work. Thus, Seoul posted a six minutes promotional video on the DMZ peace zone initiative on the Blue House’s YouTube channel aimed at securing ‘the support of the international society’ (Yonhap News, 2019, November 6). Similarly, the UNC has once again been at the core as the key player who makes the initiative possible because the DMZ is under the UNC’s control. The UNC has full authority over the highly regarded geopolitical areas such as the DMZ. Thus, inter-Korean or multinational activities crossing the territorial border are not feasible politically as well as diplomatically without the UNC’s coordination. On 3 October 2019, when peace-seeking efforts were growing, the UNC Commander, General Robert Abrams, stressed that ‘while [the two Koreas] may continue the dialogue, all of that would have to be brokered, adjudicated, observed and enforced by UN Command’ (2018, October 3). The UNC’s full control of these areas renders the US’s political and diplomatic leverage influential. As North Korea’s denuclearization has become the central focus in the world as well as on the Korean Peninsula, the UNC’s roles and responsibilities are taken as important as well. Thus, the UNC’s political leverage has become more influential, contributing to strengthening the prestige of the US as a hegemon in the region. The DMZ is not simply a military area but has become a political domain. In this political domain on the border, the US remains the most influential political actor mainly thanks to the existence of the UNC. The US’s political clout benefitted by the UNC cannot be easily transferrable to the one to its growing hegemonic rival, China. The UNC is basically a military organization, not a governmental one and thus in some sense, the US enjoys military leverages and utilities greater than other states. Although the UNC, technically as well as legally, is a multinational military organization, it does not take any directive from the international body. Rather, just one actor, the US, gives directives to the UNC through the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).2 The document on the history of the unified command, published by the US JCS, shows that the UNC belongs to one of its commands (The US JCS, 2013, pp. 15–16). The military is hierarchical culturally as well as structurally. Thus, who can give directives determines everything from the priority of current tasks to the future policy design. In this respect, the US military in Washington certainly has massive leverage over the UNC, an internationally driven legal entity, which functions as the influential military command on the Korean Peninsula. The UNC has had an influence over military operations or exercises on the Korean Peninsula where South Korea, a host nation, sixteen Sending States and NNSC countries participate directly or indirectly. Historically, the UNC used to have a full OPCON from 1950 to 1978. During this period, the UNC served as the warfighting command at a theater-level of operation as well as peacetime management. In 1978, its OPCON was transferred to the CFC but the UNC is still honoured as a vital command which used to defeat the communists. The US-led UNC’s military contribution is embedded in the history of the Korean War, which helps the US keep its hegemonic authority. The US four-star general, acting as the UNC CDR, hosts the Armistice Agreement Commemoration Ceremony on July 27 every year. In these ceremonies, the achievements by the UNC and soldiers’ sacrifices are commemorated. In this area, the US serves as a hegemonic spiritual leader thanks to the US command position. Currently, the UNC has no function of warfighting command. It still has a powerful function of peace command, though. In some sense, the UNC’s peace management authority is more influential because the Korean Peninsula does not remain at war most of the time. A full-scale war has not broken out since the end of the Korean War. The UNC plays a key role in investigating incidents that occur in the DMZ or around five islands at the Yellow Sea. When an incident occurs in its area of responsibility, the UNCMAC under the UNC dispatch the SIT to investigate whether they violated the Korean Armistice Agreement. The ‘armistice spirit’ also is a key ruler at the investigation and thus the scope of the SIT’s activity could be wider simply beyond the DMZ. Most of the time, military personnel are the main people who are investigated, but even civilians are often investigated too. When a wildfire happens within the DMZ, a civilian firefighting helicopter enters into the DMZ under the UNC’s permission. If a pilot accidentally crosses the MDL, the SIT investigates him. The UNC also intervenes in handling arms control of two Korean forces in the DMZ areas as shown in the JSA demilitarization in 2018 (Chung, 2019, pp. 484–485). Moreover, the UNC enjoys a certain tool to engage in the ROK-US military exercises and training through the NNSC. The UNC tasks the NNSC to observe them in its efforts to assess their nature over whether they are deterrent and defensive. Exercise scenarios and key staff ideas are important matters that the NNSC observes. After various observations, including major component commands, the NNSC produces its report and two generals of the NNSC deliver it to the UNC CDR. The fact that one country-led entity can ask other countries to observe the exercises of a certain alliance is evidence that it exercises military leverage over other countries. The UNC allows foreign bases to be expanded into Japan which makes its military missions more achievable. Japan is not a member state of the UNC but ironically the UNC Rear is located in Japan, which includes eight states (Graham, 2017). There is no international legal basis for the UNC Rear. Instead, the US concluded a mutual agreement with Japan and thus in 1957, the UNC Rear was established in Japan for the UNC’s military use. Those seven bases play a bridging role in receiving military assets from the Sending States aimed at providing them with the UNC at war. If the UNC is dissolved, the UNC Rear will be dismantled, which would not be helpful for maintaining the US’s influence in the region. Likewise, the UNC serves as a key entity to coordinate military assets from the Sending States. Without the UNC, the US finds it hard to ask for help from other states in times of crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The existence of the UNC makes coordination with the Sending States work autonomously. Thus, the US military’s mission success seems more likely under the existence of the UNC. Inherently, its influence over the UNC is aimed at making the Korean Peninsula stable. However, the US’s daily cooperation with member states makes them more likely to be on its side if it is confronted with a revisionist China. The UNC CDR produces an Annual Report at the end of every year and sends it to the UN according to UNSCR 84. Since the UNC CDR is inherently the US general, the US JCS has an influence over them. Annual reports state what the UNC has done for the year and the UNC CDR’s thoughts for evaluation. They make the UNC’s military mission to be recognized as important as well as fully legal by the international audience. To put it another way, the US’s hegemony is taken as benevolent through the well-functioned UNC from the military point of view as well. The UNC is basically a military organization and thus it has less economic influence than political or military. However, there is some role to play for economic leverage and utilities by the US The budget connection allows affiliated states to regard the US as a benevolent hegemon and thus encourage them to comply with the US-led order. The United States Forces Korea (USFK) deals with a military budget for all American soldiers who work under the CFC and the UNC. South Korea also contributes to its service through the defense cost-sharing process by the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). The NNSC’s budget connection with the US encourages US policies to be adopted. Despite the independent nature of the NNSC, the US military provides them with a variety of financial assistance from base facilities to transportation, service workers on camp and even drivers. The Korean Armistice Agreement states the UNC’s obligation to offer them (The Korean Armistice Agreement, 1953, p. 13). The NNSC camp, which belongs to South Korea’s territory and is located in the JSA, is practically not their base. The camp is located on an American base. Accordingly, the Directorate of Public Works (DPW) of the US Army takes care of facilities, electricity and painting on the camp. No American soldiers live on the camp but the US is in charge of the base for the NNSC personnel, leaving the one as an extremely rare case. Whenever an actor is financially supported by another, the former becomes reliant on the latter. Seen in this light, the US exercises economic leverage over the NNSC. Similarly, the US provides military personnel of the Sending States who work in the UNC with financial assistance, such as military quarters or houses. Thus, in some sense economic leverage makes the US’s bond with the Sending States stronger. The existence of the UNC makes the connection possible, contributing to the US hegemony’s maintenance at the end of the day. Furthermore, Washington in the Trump era tends to see alliances from the viewpoint of economic interest. In a situation where the UNC has increased its political and military leverage by a window of opportunity from denuclearization and peace posture, the US’s support or assistance has become more vital. The increased political and military leverage seems to promote the US to be armed with economic leverage as well. Washington has pushed Seoul to pay much more for South Korea’s defense since 2018 and is expected to continue to do (Kim, 2019). In particular, the US reportedly demanded more than five times at the negotiation in 2019 to South Korea regarding defense cost-sharing, which clearly shows the impacts of its security role on economic clout (Lee, Cha, and Shin 2019). Although political, military and economic leverage is inherently rooted in the internationally given legal institution of the UNC, the UNC itself possesses institutionally driven leverage that it can use to make other actors follow the US’s directions or requests without strong opposition. The logic is in the works because of its inherently given institutional justification. The UNC was the first organization which was established under the logic of collective security. That rare institutional setting tends to encourage the UNC to continue to be recognized as valuable. Maintenance of a hegemony requires soft power as well as hard power. The UNC was given legally by the international entity, the UNSC although the US had an influential role to make it. Then the US-led UNC is taken as a peace promoter, not warmonger thanks to its unique roles. Thus, the US’s activities by the UNC’s mission seem to increase its softer power in the region. The US’s attempt to build institutional leverage by the UNC had already begun in the time of its establishment in 1950. Who gave its name: the UN or the UNSC? Neither did. The UNSC just mentioned ‘a unified command’. The US, though, called this unified command ‘the United Nations Command’. The organization’s name thus creates the illusion for international audiences that the UN is in charge of the UNC. However, it is far from the truth. In 1995, then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made it clear that the UNC has nothing to do with the UN (Ahn, 2019). In the meantime, its name has officially been used since 1950 without resistance. As such, it has institutionally been acknowledged by international audiences as time went by. The fact that the words of ‘the United Nations’ is included in its name makes international audiences misunderstand that the UNC’s activities are being made exclusively for the world. The name-led institutionalization has clearly been a great success from the US’s viewpoint in the sense that it has made international audiences think of the US-led organization as a purely multination one and that the US is not acting alone. This helps sustain the perception of that of the US is a benevolent hegemony power. The longer regimes exist, the stronger they become. This logic could be referred to as institutional inertia. The UNC has functioned without any cessation ever since 1950, which serves as a very rare case from the viewpoint of the durability as well as its origin. In principle, there is no single player who deals with the UNC’s mission. Thus, its decisions are not taken as unilateral. In reality, since only US generals assume the command position, the UNC’s decisions seem likely to be heavily preferable to the US’s interests. Although the UNC stands firm institutionally, the UNC CDR still attempts to remind others of the strong legal ground by annually hosting Armistice Agreement Commemorative Ceremony. Considering a number of tasks, the UNC has only a small staff dispatched from member states, which consists of 30 key staffs officers in addition to the UNCMAC Secretariat personnel. In this regard, the UNC could be the most cost-effective organization of all militaries in the world. How is this possible? The prestigious nature of the UNC as an institutionally firm regime makes up for its limited personnel, which makes the Sending States, the NNSC and Japan contribute to the missions more. In summary, the UNC’s institutionally driven leverage creates the perception of the US as a benevolent hegemon in East Asia, a position in which it rarely finds itself in other regions of the world. The US increases its influence over the Asia-Pacific region through the UNC’s security management of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the UNC serves as a ‘the two-for-one entity’ for promoting US interests. From the US’s perspective, ‘killing two birds with one stone’ is the biggest prize from the existence of the UNC. However, this ‘two-for-one’ perspective is not likely accepted by the other members of the UNC, who may focus on its primary mission only, that of maintaining the armistice. Accordingly, a ‘for whom’ question could be seriously raised internally as well as externally.

#### US hegemony will continue in response to China’s Rise

**Singh 22**[Bhubhindar, 18 May, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441,BK>]

According to experts, American unipolarity is not a ‘moment’ but has lasting power. This is even in response to China’s robust political, economic and strategic rise. Beckley ([2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441)) noted that the intensifying US-China competition is not a period of power transition but a continuation of the American unipolar era (pp. 3–4). The sustainability of the US is explained by its relative advantages over its competitors. These include: (1) its superior material indicators compared to its competitors, including China, which weakens external constraints on America’s comprehensive power; (2) its strong ability to shape global affairs; and (3) its geographical and demographic advantages over its competitors (Beckley, [2018](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441), p. 2; Brooks & Wohlforth, [2008](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441), [2016](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441); Wohlforth, [1999](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441), 28–37). While these factors correctly explain the sustainability of US hegemony at the global level, their applicability at the regional level, especially in Northeast Asia, is less clear. This is due to China’s asymmetric military strategy and geography-based advantages – factors that have the potential to weaken America’s regional strategic edge. Nevertheless, this article shows that the US hegemony is durable and remains a critical source of peace and stability in Northeast Asia but in a ‘renegotiated’ arrangement.[4](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441#EN0004) This is not only because of America’s extant relative strategic and economic advantages over China, as argued by the unipolarity scholars, but also due to two other factors – the proactive effort by its regional allies to preserve US hegemony and China’s problems in building an alternative regional order.

#### Allied support and China’s weaknesses keep the U.S on top

**Singh 22**[Bhubhindar, 18 May, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441,BK>]

There are two other factors that support the preservation of US hegemony in the coming decades, but have received little attention in the unipolarity literature. First, the durability of the US hegemony is secured by an expanded support from its regional allies in the post-2010 period. Though the American hegemony is expected to remain strong, its authority, as argued by Ikenberry ([2011](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441)), has experienced relative weakening due to China’s growing political, military and economic power and impact on regional affairs. The ‘renegotiated’ outcome, as argued here, will not see a decline in American hegemony, as the US allies have boosted efforts to preserve American hegemony in the region. Though these states are unable to influence the outcome of the regional balance of power, US allies, nevertheless, are stakeholders who shape the regional dynamics in critical ways. The regional states, especially US allies, have pursued more activist foreign policy strategies in support of the strong American military presence in the region and maintain a resilient US hegemony (see Singh et al., [2019](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441), pp. 29–31). For instance, the emergence of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) promoted by Japan is a way to keep the US engaged in the region and counter Chinese attempts at regional dominance (MOFA & Japan, [2007](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441)). FOIP is aligned with the liberal internationalism’s organizing principles that include the promotion of economic interdependence, strengthened institutionalism and a rules-based order. Moreover, when the US withdrew from the TPP in 2017, Japan took the lead to garner support from the remaining 11 countries that led to the eventual signing of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Second, the durability of the US-led regional order is also a result of the weaknesses related to China’s attempts to install its own alternative order (see Kai He’s paper in this special issue). China has faced resistance in its order-building attempts beyond the economic realm – externally from America’s overwhelming power and its regional allies, and internally from its own domestic challenges, such as maintaining sustainable and equitable growth across the country, aging population, environmental issues and others. As opposed to the US during the early postwar period, China does not have sufficient strategic resources and goodwill to support its order-building efforts beyond the economic domain. Any ambitious attempt to pursue order-building in political and strategic domains has been viewed in suspicious terms and countered by Northeast Asian states. A good example is how Japan countered China’s attempt to impose a narrow conception of ‘East Asia’ (made up of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) on the East Asian multilateral process. With support from selected ASEAN states, Japan pushed for the incorporation of other dialogue partners, such as Australia, New Zealand and India as core members of the East Asian community and the ASEAN-led multilateral order (Terada, 2010). Suspicions from the regional states in response to Beijing’s increasingly hard-line foreign policy strategy (as seen in its tough diplomatic approach towards Hong Kong and Taiwan, its assertive policy towards its territorial disputes with Japan and several Southeast Asian states, as well as its economic coercive policies towards Australia and South Korea) have further hardened, (see Choe, 2021; The Economist, 2022).

### A2: Fill-In (General)

#### Criticisms of US hegemony are inherent to any hegemonic country, not specifically about US heg

Nau 9 – [Henry, Professor of Political Science and IR at George Washington University, “Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?”, March 2009, JSTOR,https://www.jstor.org/stable/25482053?saml\_data=eyJzYW1sVG9rZW4iOiI0ZTc2ZGVlOC0zMmRjLTRkZTktOWYyMC1hZTNhODcyZDkwZTIiLCJlbWFpbCI6InVtMTk0NTU5QHVtaWNoLmVkdSIsImluc3RpdHV0aW9uSWRzIjpbImJhYzI1OTdlLTI3YzMtNGIyNy04YzJhLTE3NDlkOWUyYjI1NSIsIjM2MjdjZWE2LTM1YmItNDJkNS04M2ZmLTY4ZmY5ZDc4NDhiZCJdfQ#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents]

What is curious about this volume, like so many on globalization, are the questions it does not address. There is no serious discussion, for example, of the security requirements of globalization. If the United States did not police globalization today, who would? It is true that hegemony is not the only peaceful configuration of power in history. The European Union, a community of relatively equal powers, is a current example. But Germany and France did not cooperate after World War II to end centuries of internecine European conflict without the presence of the US security umbrella. To expect China and Japan to cooperate in the absence of a continuing US security role in Asia assumes a lot and requires at least some careful exploration. In addition, except for the contribution by Bajpai and Sahni, the volume is silent on the debate going on inside other countries about how those countries would run the world if the United States were weaker. The focus is entirely on US dominion which is strongly criticized. But why is there the implicit expectation that European, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilian or Indian foreign policy, which according to the volume should benefit from the new "bargaining chips" provided by globalization, would do much better? It's natural for non-Americans to be more optimistic about their contributions to global peace and prosperity, just as Americans may be about their contributions. But non-Americans have to make the case, just as they find fault with the case made by Americans. If American leadership has been so deficient, how did the Cold War end without a hot war and how has the world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the Cold War ended? The volume seems completely oblivious to the fact that this latest "outburst" of capitalism has raised the standard of living of more people living under the poverty line than ever before. China and India, with most of the world's poorest population, are growing three and four times faster than Europe, Japan and America, and have been for 20 years or more. Would this have happened under Soviet (if Moscow had won the Cold War), European, Chinese, Indian or Japanese hegemony or consortium? Would these countries have championed freer trade policies for East Asian and now Chinese, Indian and Latin American exporters, or sympathized with the promotion of human rights in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, where Russian and Chinese policies currently block international efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities? The criticism of America is not the problem. A dominant power is fair game. But the criticism also ironically takes for granted the benefits of American hegemony, the open markets and global security provided by US foreign policy, the flexibility of America's middle classes, which have transitioned to better jobs in America so that more jobs could be created in poorer countries, and the light footprint of American imperialism that since 1945 has nurtured not colonies but democratic self-governments in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Admittedly, America's soft power is under a cloud, but the relevant question is, compared to what. Some, if not much, of the opposition to America has little to do with America. It has to do with authoritarian ideologies in other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that prefer elitist over middle-class economies and nationalist over liberal political ideologies.

### A2: China Rise

#### China will not achieve regional hegemony—lack of political allies in the Indo-Pacific region

**Roy 20** – Denny; Ph.D. in political science, University of Chicago, 1991) writes mainly on Northeast Asian international security issues; “China won’t achieve regional hegemony”; 19 Mar 2020, , The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 101-117, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734301

The recent rise of China has been undeniably impressive, prompting many observers to conclude it is destined to achieve hegemony, or the ability to compel the other governments in the region to conform to China’s preferences on political and strategic issues as well as to prevent or roll back any major strategic re-adjustment that China chooses to oppose. Some argue that the United States should accept what appears to be inevitable and get out of China’s way by yielding up America’s own postwar position of strategic preeminence in the Indo-Pacific.1 But attaining major power status, even to the point of rivaling the United States in economic and military influence, does not make China a hegemon or guarantee that China will continue to ascend until it dominates the region. Discussions of an impending Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific are instead based on the relative growth of China’s economic clout and military power. Superficial material capabilities, however, do not tell the whole story. If the United States maintains its present level of commitment to Indo-Pacific leadership, Beijing will be unable to establish a Chinese hegemony over the region, although a burgeoning China will be able to reduce US freedom of action. And even if the United States decided to withdraw from its military bases and alliances, China would probably be unable to comprehensively impose its will on the region through military force. China’s potential to dominate is restrained by a combination of both domestic and international factors. Beijing’s own frequently stated position is that “China will never seek hegemony, expansion or [a] sphere of influence”2—however, this position lacks credibility. China has for decades criticized the United States for its military bases and alliances in the western Pacific as well as for policies that allegedly worsen geopolitical tensions.3 The CCP has defined China’s vital interests—i.e., the issues over which the Chinese would see themselves as defending rather than aggressing—so expansively that fulfilling them all would constitute a Chinese regional hegemony in practical terms. The list includes demands that Taiwan must become a province of the PRC; that the international community recognize China as owner of the Japan-administered Senkaku islands as well as most of the East and South China Seas; that Beijing has the right to veto selected South Korean defense policies (e.g., the THAAD missile defense controversy of 2016–17); that the Japanese government must “not make a fuss about” and cease surveillance of PLA ships or aircraft patrolling the Japanese coastline;4 and that foreign entities must conform to the Beijing-approved interpretation of myriad important political questions involving China. In effect, then, the collection of what Beijing identifies as vital interests equates to a Chinese regional sphere of influence—a buffer zone around its territory within which Beijing would have veto power over the activities of foreigners. It is evident that China does indeed seek the preeminent regional role now held by the United States.5 The question, however, is whether China can feasibly attain these ambitions. What Beijing identifies as vital interests equates to a Chinese regional sphere of influence. The Legacy of Benign **Hegemony China will not achieve regional dominance for several reasons**. The first is that most of the Indo-Pacific countries will resist, rather than facilitate, a change in regional leadership. Some hegemonies are more popular than others. Historically, a hegemon establishes a regional order—arrangements, rules, and norms of international relations—that suits its own interests.6 The willingness of the dominant power to accommodate the preferences of other states in the region can vary. The United States has been a relatively benevolent hegemon. On two occasions when member states tried to extricate themselves from the Soviet order in Eastern Europe, for example—Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968—Moscow intervened to quash these movements with military force. By contrast, the US military withdrew from two valuable bases in the Philippines in 1992 when the Philippine government refused to extend their leases. Support among regional middle and smaller powers for American preeminence is relatively high because many of these states see their economic and security interests well-served by the US-sponsored order’s openness and liberal values.7 Conversely, many regional countries have historically-based fears of Chinese domination.8 Vietnam, for example, has suffered a total of nearly a thousand years of Chinese occupation and cultural imperialism during its history. Recent actions such as China’s claim to own nearly the entire South China Sea in contravention of the UN Law of the Sea Treaty (which Beijing itself has signed) revive regional fears of recrudescent Chinese imperialism. China’s position as the main trading partner for regional states seemingly offers Beijing the prospect of gaining hegemony on the cheap—by leveraging the economic dependence of its neighbors, Beijing could get other governments to accept Chinese leadership on regional political and strategic issues and even to cede some of their autonomy to China. In recent years, Beijing has successfully used its economic weight to wrest concessions with political implications from large corporations and universities in many countries, including the United States.9 In Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines under the Duterte administration, PRC economic power appears to have induced policies supporting Beijing’s regional agenda.10 As much as Beijing would wish otherwise, however, China’s economic influence over Indo-Pacific states generally does not equate to a corresponding amount of political influence, nor does it automatically result in states siding with the PRC. Although China is the top trade partner for Australia and South Korea and is the top supplier of imports into Japan, all three countries remain US treaty allies that host US military forces. Australian Defense Minister Linda Reynolds recently expressed a commitment to work more closely with “nations that share our values” against “countries prepared to flout the rules-based order.”11 China is also the largest trading partner of Indonesia and Singapore. After years of trying to stay out of the South China Sea territorial dispute, Jakarta’s policy has recently taken a hard turn against China’s position: renaming a portion of China’s claim the North Natuna Sea, destroying trespassing Chinese fishing boats, and beefing up Indonesian military forces based on Great Natuna Island. While China often criticizes the US military presence in the region, Singapore is so supportive that it built a pier at its Changi Naval Base to accommodate visiting US aircraft carriers. Recently, the Indo-Pacific region has seen a backlash against perceived Chinese attempts to exploit business and trade relationships for political purposes. Canberra sided with Washington to bar Chinese corporation Huawei from providing undersea internet cables for Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Upon his return to power in 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad reviewed his country’s economic relationship with China, warning of “new colonialism” that “has the effect of diminishing the freedom of action of other countries.”12

#### China does not have sufficient military power to Impose Hegemony

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Insufficient Military Power to Impose Hegemony If China cannot buy political fealty, the alternative—imposing hegemony upon an unwilling Indo-Pacific—would be immensely difficult and expensive. China lacks the military strength to capture hegemony by force. Unquestionably, China’s military buildup and modernization have advanced during the past two decades from a badly outclassed potential conventional US opponent to one that might successfully frustrate US military operations in some scenarios. The Chinese military could seize and hold a disputed South China Sea island from one of the rival claimants, for example, and could threaten serious damage against US forces entering the theater the protect a friendly country. China has the advantages of geographic proximity to likely conflict sites and proficiency in missile technology, both especially useful for the task of warding off an attempt by the United States to surge forces into the region. Nevertheless, the US military is still the world’s most capable across the full spectrum of combat and logistical capabilities.13 China also has significant military disadvantages. First, over half of China’s official defense spending goes toward internal security, mostly in restive areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.14 Second, China probably cannot leapfrog its way to technological parity with the US military. The increased complexity of military technology has made it harder for competitors to free-ride on research and development and to simply copy leading-edge weapons systems. Despite the opportunities presented by economic globalization and even with China’s massive state-sponsored efforts to steal advanced technology, the Chinese continue to fall short of the standard-bearers in some kinds of weapons systems such as submarines and advanced fighter aircraft.15 Finally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suffers a dramatic deficit in combat experience relative to the US military. US forces have fought overseas every decade since the beginning of the Cold War, including continuous large-scale military operations in the Middle East for nearly two decades. The US armed forces consequently have deep reservoirs of experienced warfighters at all levels from frontline troops to general officers. By contrast, PLA forces have not fought a war since their 1979 incursion into Vietnam, when they performed less than impressively against Vietnamese troops and withdrew after one month.

#### Internal Factors prevent China from achieving hegemony

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China exhibits weaknesses in its hegemonic potential, some of them self-inflicted. Serious political instability inside China would undercut attempts to play a regional leadership role. Yet Xi Jinping’s re-centralization of political power since 2012 has made the Chinese political system more brittle. Eliminating the term limits for his leadership tenure adds to the enemies Xi has made through his anti-corruption campaign. Many ambitious elites outside of Xi’s protégés now see no opportunity to rise up in the ranks of power.23 Some of them might resort to working against Xi, hoping to benefit from a leadership crisis. Xi’s accumulation of unchecked power has also intensified the danger that he will make a disastrous national policy decision that might otherwise be avoided by a collective leadership arrangement. Indeed, the Party’s movement in the early post-Mao era from rule by a single all-powerful paramount leader to rule by a small group of top Politburo members was a reaction to the profound harm done to China by Mao’s unchecked decision-making, including his launch of the Great Leap Forward (1958–62) and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Xi has now restored that discredited leadership model. Furthermore, Xi has increased the likelihood of a disruptive socio-political crisis inside China through his accelerated authoritarianism. Xi’s approaches to managing large groups of people considered possible threats to the authority of the Party have been heavy-handed rather than skillful. These approaches include crackdowns against Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese Christians, mass incarceration and attempted indoctrination of Uyghurs, prematurely dismantling the autonomy promised for Hong Kong, and revived constraints on intellectuals and advocates of a stronger civil society in China. Overreliance on the available tools of oppression in the short term risks worsening public anger and desperation in the longer term. A simmering cauldron of various discontents at home does not help China project power abroad.

#### Cracks in China’s Economic Foundation prevent China from achieving hegemony

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An exceptionally strong economy is a necessary foundation for projecting hegemonic power. China has established itself as the top supplier of manufactured goods to the Indo-Pacific countries, creating a common perception of growing Chinese economic domination. China’s economic strength, however, is **easily exaggerated**. Official Chinese statistics consistently overstate Chinese growth and wealth. Assessments of the size of China’s economy typically employ GDP adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP method, which controls for the different prices of the same commodities in different economies, artificially inflates the appearance of wealth in a relatively poor country being compared to a richer country. More generally, emphasis on GDP as the key indicator of economic vitality obscures the problem of what economists call “bad GDP.” This term refers to outcomes that do not contribute to national strength such as overproduction and unrepaid debt. Tellingly, China had a larger economy than countries such as Britain and Japan which militarily rode roughshod over China in the nineteenth century.24 An alternative, and in some ways more meaningful, measurement is GDP per capita. On this score, China was actually below the world average in 2018 (US$11,312) at US$9,771 and far below the US figure of US$62,641.25 Several serious structural flaws threaten China’s future economic growth. China’s banks are state-owned and lend mainly to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are largely unprofitable.26 The banking industry could easily collapse under even a moderate economic shock, dragging down the entire financial system.27 Tackling the country’s massive air and water pollution problems will be a drag on Chinese economic growth far into the future.28 Many Americans are deeply concerned that US debt is now over 100 percent of US GDP—but China’s debt has reached 300 percent of China’s GDP.29 Although large, China’s economy is not especially productive, lagging far behind the United States.30 The International Monetary Fund calculates that growth in China’s total factor productivity, or the amount of production not accounted for by increased inputs, has averaged only about 2 percent annually since the global financial crisis that began in 2007.31 **Several serious structural flaws threaten China’s future economic growth.** Continued nominal rapid economic growth in China is uncertain. Even according to Chinese official statistics, which are often intentionally inflated, during 2019 China saw its slowest GDP growth rate since 1992, and the slowdown was not a result of China’s trade war with the United States. Rather, it is consistent with a decade-long trend of decline based on gradual changes within the Chinese economy.32China is far from guaranteed to join the short list of countries that have successfully moved from middle-income to high-income, and China’s immense size will make the challenge relatively more difficult. China’s demographic trends suggest changes that will force Chinese economic growth into a long-term period of leveling off. China will certainly “grow old before it grows rich,” at least in terms of per capita GDP. China’s huge population will begin gradually declining around 2025, mainly because couples are choosing to have fewer children because of the rising cost of living and because the “one child” policy, combined with the cultural preference for boys, created a reduction in the female population, resulting in a drop in births. The cohort of workers aged 18 to 30, which supplies factory labor and is crucial to maintaining the country’s economic growth, is already shrinking.33 By 2030, China will have a retiree for every two working-age people,34 which will require both the state and individual families to divert a large amount of their resources into care for the elderly. Much of China’s economic dynamism of the post-Mao years resulted from harnessing a gigantic pool of low-cost labor created by young people moving from the countryside into urban factory work. But with 60 percent of China’s population now living in the cities35 and many other countries providing cheaper labor, China will need to find other ways of sustaining rapid growth.CCP elites recognize the need for economic restructuring but have struggled to implement it. Outgoing PRC Premier Wen Jiabao famously warned in 2013 that China’s economic growth was “unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”36 Since Deng Xiaoping began promoting major marketizing reforms in 1978, the Chinese government has struggled to find a balance between two contradictory imperatives: economic growth and stability. To ensure continued healthy economic growth, China needs to decrease central control, speed liberalization, and stop coddling loss-making SOEs. Such policies, however, damage the Party’s popularity by creating mass unemployment and social upheaval. The Chinese government led by Hu Jintao (2002–12) decided to implement the principle of allowing the market to determine the allocation of resources. Predictably, this effort floundered because it threatened the accustomed profitability of various powerful interest groups including bureaucracies, provincial governments, industrial sectors, and the military. Xi ascended to paramount leadership in 2012 with a mandate to restart the marketization of the Chinese economy, but, against the usual opposition, he has achieved only modest reforms despite vigorously suppressing dissent and removing many of his enemies. Xi’s efforts are at least partly negated by countervailing policies such as strengthening Party control over business decisions, favoring chosen SOEs over the private sector, increasing political interference in the judicial system, tightening the restrictions on discussion of political issues in China, and requiring China’s best minds to divert their attention away from innovative activities to read Xi Jinping Thought.37 The CCP seems trapped by its unwillingness to tolerate the political consequences of the changes necessary to unlock China’s economic potential. The required capabilities for hegemony are a relatively large and healthy economy, a technologically advanced military that can project decisive power far beyond national borders, and a government that is able to pursue a coherent and effective strategy without being impeded by domestic political or social conditions. China need not solve all of its internal problems as a prerequisite to dominating its region—having only a moderately wealthy society, for example, would not necessarily prevent the PRC from having a wealthy state that could pour resources into enhancing national military strength. It is possible that China could muddle through its domestic political, economic, and social challenges for the next few decades while maintaining a solid growth rate and fielding Asia’s strongest military forces. The standard for hegemony, however, is higher than this. It seems unlikely that China will overcome its internal challenges to achieve a sufficiently strong and stable platform from which to attempt to dominate the region.

#### China cannot rival US hegemony – negative perceptions by other powers and a lack of others sharing their vision hamper Chinese hegemony

Smith 20 – Nicholas Ross, PhD in Politics & International Relations (University of Auckland) and MA in European Studies (University of Canterbury), “Why China’s dreams of global leadership are fading fast”, 10/12/20, South Chine Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3104870/why-chinas-dreams-global-leadership-are-fading-fast

However, for China to be capable of reshaping the international order, it needs to have partners that share its vision. International order is built through developing strong friendships with prominent powers that encompass not only strategic and normative alignments but also cultural understanding as well as strong historical foundations. The problem for China is that, beyond Russia, Pakistan and some quasi-client states in Africa, very few countries seem ready to jump aboard the “express train of China’s development”. The negative state of global perceptions is a significant blow to China’s international aims and desires. Some of this is beyond China’s control. Its status as a non-Western rising power means that whatever it does, it will be viewed with suspicion by outsiders (especially in the current West-centric order).

#### No China heg

Maitra ’22, Sumantra Maitra, Master of International Studies from the University of Otago, National Security Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, “Rise of a Counter-Elite”, 2022-01-01, the national interest, (https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA689860787&v=2.1&it=r)

Most realist international relations theories (and even most liberal ones) follow some fundamental assumptions--that the world is anarchic without a global policeman and global hegemony is unsustainable. Nation-states, the primary units of international politics, seek to survive in that anarchy. Of them, great powers are the main actors. States seeking hegemony are often balanced, as balancing is the norm. The system is amoral and Darwinian, and most hegemons overstretch and collapse, though some smart powers successfully retrench, or even "buck-pass" to other states during times of stress. Different schools of realism can, of course, claim and predict different ways on whether and how states seek survival. Some would argue that states are power maximizers, while others would argue that states are overwhelmingly security maximizers. Different schools of realism also conclude different behavior even while analyzing from the same theoretical baseline. For example, all realists agree that China is the biggest potential threat to American interests. Some might argue that the United States needs to arm Taiwan and balance China actively by facilitating an alliance network in the Asia-Pacific. Others might prefer the United States to be "offshore balancers" and buck-pass the security burden to regional powers, drawing attention to the fact that China is practically alliance-less and is surrounded by powerful and rich states (most of them ideologically aligned with the United States or opposed to potential Chinese hegemony), one with nuclear power and all with large navies. The Asia-Pacific in 2021 is dissimilar to a broken Europe in 1949, susceptible to an expansionist Soviet Union. Regardless, all realists agree that America is a very secure great power, with a geographical advantage and hemispheric hegemony, and overwhelming aggregate power compared to peer rivals. Most top universities are in the United States, as are most top defense industrial sectors, businesses, and companies. The United States still commands the global commons and is the primary destination of trade, and while there might be trade rivals such as the EU and China, it is unlikely that there will be a great power challenger that will topple America from its perch at least in the near foreseeable future. Commensurate with the logic of realism, there are two regions that are of primary interest for American strategic security: Western Europe and the Eastern Pacific. If dominated by a rival hegemon, these regions can make the American coastline vulnerable and can result in consolidated economic power in rival hands, overwhelming American trade. In other words, these are regions where the United States did and would again do anything to prevent an expansionist hegemony of a peer rival. That said, there are no threats of Russian armor sweeping through the Belgian meadows anytime soon, nor is there any likelihood of Chinese marines landing in Japan and Australia in a war of expansion. If China starts a war with India, Taiwan, or Vietnam, it would at worst be bogged down in a gruesome war of attrition comparable to World War I, and at best be mired in a bleeding long-term counterinsurgency far worse than Iraq and Afghanistan. Either of these scenarios would almost certainly end any potential Chinese expansionism.

#### Chinese Heg is regional NOT global at best

Foot ‘19, Rosemary Foot, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, 09/04/19, International politics, “China’s rise and US hegemony: Renegotiating hegemonic order in East Asia?”, (https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/10.1057/s41311-019-00189-5#Sec6)

China is enunciating these predominantly economic-security-related ideas and backing them up with policy action at a time when the Western powers and the USA in particular apparently have lost their attachment to or confidence in the liberal normative model associated especially with the 1990s—democracy, human rights promotion and protection, and belief in the power of the market to deliver benefits to the majority. A more powerful China has emerged into a world that Beijing believes to be less resistant to its approach and political–economic model, containing a more obvious proliferation of values within which Chinese ideas can find greater purchase. This enabling environment should allow China to form at least what Clark refers to as a ‘coalitional hegemony’—that is, acceptance or legitimation of its role as a reshaper or creator of regional order but perhaps only among a subset of potential members and what he refers to as a ‘restricted constituency of support’ (2011b, 123; Goh 2019, 635). A rather restricted constituency becomes more likely as an outcome because, while China’s material attributes impress and some of its ideas resonate, they have not all been put to the benign purposes of reassurance. Neither does the Chinese leadership acknowledge the ways in which the diversity of the Asia-Pacific complicates receptivity to the solutions to regional ordering that it proposes, or the doubts that some of China’s own commentators have expressed and that can weaken its central message. The bar is always set high anyway for the rising challenger. It is inevitably seen as the disrupter and it is a matter of interpretation and experience whether that disruption is on balance for the good or bad.

### A2: EU Rise

#### It’s still unlikely to be the EU

Norrlof 10 – Carla, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, “America's Global Advantage : US Hegemony and International Cooperation”, 4/29/10, Cambridge University Press, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=502502.

Furthermore, the European Union is, I think, more likely to displace American power. The reason is simple. Cooperation in Europe cuts to the heart of core superpower functions. The European Union has a large product market where other countries can offload their exports. A European currency union has been in force for a decade, supplying the euro, a currency widely used, with the potential of becoming the primary currency. Significant advances have also been made in the field of security cooperation. Despite these portents, even the European Union is unlikely to take over America’s role in the world economy. While it is possible that the euro will crowd the dollar out to the extent that a symmetrical, multiple, key currency system, is introduced, the euro is unlikely to replace the dollar as key currency. On the security dimension, there is no prospect for the European Union to rival the United States in the foreseeable future. It is even unclear whether the political will exists to create a rival autonomous capability. The second Bush presidency did much to speed up security cooperation, but the initiative quickly petered out, and one wonders how much transatlantic discord would be needed to create a critical security force when policies so disliked in European quarters could not generate stronger developments. This gets to the crux of what keeps American hegemony alive. Transforming the current power structure is not only about America’s relative weakening, but also about other states’ incentives and capacities to organize. **Currently, they are too dependent on America**. **They cannot project power because they do not have the autonomy to define and pursue their interests.** Both East Asia and Europe rely on America economically and militarily, Europe less so economically than in the past. But, as we have seen, economic and security functions intersect. This makes it virtually impossible to reach the top, without assuring self-sufficiency in both domains. Of course, in our globalized world, no actor can turn its back on all others in the system. Everyone is interdependent to some extent, although not everyone is dependent to the same extent. Recognizing shared dependence is important for all actors but, for any single actor with the ambition to rule the world, paying attention to the differential vulnerability that comes with relative dependence is imperative. If other Great Powers become serious about closing the American era, they will not be able to continue to depend on the American system for their economic well-being and basic security. Those longing for another world order may be disappointed with them for lacking the political will to stand on their own feet. However, a crisp lesson from this exploration of the determinants and consequences of American power may very well be that, while breaking away from an inequitable system which is exploitative is hard, breaking away from an inequitable system which is not, is harder. The substitution of American leadership is slowed by the way American power is exercised. Not quite benevolent, the current world order is, for the most part, mutually beneficial. Everyone benefits from cooperation, although not everyone benefits equally, and the gains from cooperation are asymmetrically distributed at the crest. This leads me to predict that rapid decline is not on its way. **America will bounce back, preserving its unique position in the international system for the foreseeable future.**

## Impacts

### Impact – Great Power War

#### American unipolarity solves great power war.

Beckley 18 - [Michael, Michael Beckley is a Fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower”, Published 2018, Cornell University Press, doi: 10.1080/10402659.2016.1166720] //adhi

The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a ruling power. Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these conflicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths worldwide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars. 4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent. Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined. What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life. Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans suddenly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dramatic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict. Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it. As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challengers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions. History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

### Impact – Russia

#### Russia is empirically aggressive, and is now exercising capabilities to threaten the United States, but NATO hegemony checks that

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After many years of U.S. hegemony following the Cold War, Russia has gained—and is exercising—the capabilities to threaten the United States and its interests abroad. Russia invests in military capabilities to confront the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other neighboring states. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea demonstrated its use of hybrid warfare to accomplish its aims and project power across the Black Sea. Moscow is propping up Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad, defending Iran at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and amassing military forces in the Arctic. It has authorized multiple cyber-attacks against the United States and continues to target vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industrial base. It uses political warfare to sow discord in the United States, from interfering in U.S. elections to spreading propaganda about the “dangers” of U.S missile defense. Perhaps most significantly, Russia invests billions of dollars into adding to its nuclear arsenal and developing new nuclear capabilities, disrupting the nuclear balance with the United States. Consequently, the current and previous administrations have framed U.S.-Russia relations as a competition, which involves two states striving for global power and opposing interests. Such a competition implies that actors in opposition to each other are pursuing a victory. But what does it look like to win in a competition with Russia? Based on the U.S. history of war and conflict, Americans typically view winning a competition as a definitive change in status quo, or strategic realignment, that works in the U.S. favor. A model American victory might look like the outcome of the Revolutionary War, which resulted in the independent American state, or Japan’s transformation to a democratic ally after it lost World War II. It once appeared that the United States was making progress toward this model of strategic realignment for Russia after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union fell. Much of U.S.-Russian policy through the 2000’s was rooted in the idea that with a little more nudging, Russia would complete the transition from unfriendly autocracy to democratic member of the rules-based international order. Such policy is evidenced by President George W. Bush’s push for a new era of improved relations with Russia, and President Barack Obama’s attempted Russian “reset.” While the Russian threat has worsened in recent years, one school of thought argues that the United States can still achieve this strategic realignment once Russia achieves full internal political change. Activists like Vladimir Kara-Murza argue such change could occur in the near term. Another camp argues that the United States can end the competition if it stops antagonizing Russia. This school of thought accepts the premise that U.S. capabilities like missile defense provoke Russia to build up its forces and asserts that unilateral concessions will convince Russia to draw back its forces as well. Others go further to argue that the Russian threat is overblown and Russia is too weak to pose a serious threat, so there is no competition to “win;” instead, the United States should redirect unneeded resources away from U.S.-Russia competition. Get exclusive insider information from Heritage experts delivered straight to your inbox each week. Subscribe to The Agenda >> This paper argues that Russia’s fundamental nature and interests will continue to threaten the United States for the foreseeable future and therefore a path to a traditional concept of victory is unlikely. It rejects the idea that Russia will achieve full internal change and become friendly to the United States due to its longstanding nature as an aggressive, paranoid, power-seeking, and autocratic state, no matter its leader. Based on this assessment, concessions or attempts at cooperation with Russia will fail. Indeed, history illustrates that Russia interprets these as weaknesses and exploits the opportunity to advance its position. >>> Where’s Biden on Growing Nuclear Threats? As a result, the closest the United States can come to “winning” is successfully managing competition with Russia to mitigate the threat it poses and keep Russian aggression at bay. To manage competition, the United States must strengthen its capabilities and posture required to deter Russian mischief in all arenas of competition as well as avoid making concessions. This recommendation includes, but is not limited to, increasing U.S. defense budgets; strengthening nuclear deterrence; countering and maintaining resiliency to Russian political warfare; and actively responding to Russian aggression in the European theater. Russia’s Nature Makes Favorable Change Unlikely U.S.-Russian relations have ebbed and flowed over the past century. Although different Russian leaders or world circumstances have made for a more cordial relationship with Russia at times, Russian history demonstrates that the interests and tendencies that cause conflict with the United States today are inherent to Russia’s character. These tendencies are therefore unlikely to change in a manner favorable to U.S. interests. Russia has a history of aggression toward its neighbors that has often resulted in loss or humiliation. While the United States has largely avoided conflict within its borders due to its geographic isolation, Russia has fought with bordering states or territories throughout its history. As early as the 1100’s, what was then the Kievan Rus federation suffered brutal losses by fighting the Mongols. Later, Russia lost the Crimean War of 1853, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 after invading Japan, World War I, and the Cold War. The Russians also battled Napoleon in 1812 and Nazi Germany during World War II. This history of fighting and invasion strongly influences Russia’s national character. Due to its vast and near-indefensible territory, Russia is aggressive and even paranoid about any potential threats to its sovereignty. In the 1100’s, the Mongols invaded when Russian princes rejected a Mongolian peace request out of fear and suspicion that the Mongols would advance into Russian territory. To protect its territory, Russia has sought to preempt invasion by expanding its borders or establishing a buffer zone of friendly actors. As Catherine the Great famously stated, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained rule over its border satellite states to strengthen its defense against growing NATO forces. Even after the war, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin tried to establish a Commonwealth of Independent States with former Soviet satellite states to maintain influence and leverage surrounding its borders. Russia maintains a sense of providential destiny to be a great power and avoid humiliation. This sense of entitlement has been expressed in different ways throughout Russian history. Russians take pride in their defeats by attrition of Napoleon and Nazi Germany, which they refer to as the Patriotic War of 1812 and The Great Patriotic War, respectively. During the Cold War, the Soviets saw themselves as the vanguard of worldwide revolution. Intertwined with Russia’s desire to expand its borders or maintain a buffer zone as part of its paranoid defense, expansion has also been integral to this sense of exceptionalism. As expert Leon Aron describes, unlike in Western Europe, Russian expansion occurred at the same time as state-building. For instance, early expansion was justified through the spread of Russian Orthodoxy, and later through the advance of communism during the era of the Soviet Union. This great power entitlement often clashes with the fact that Russia has “almost always been a relatively weak power” that faces humiliating defeats over time. As a result, it is in Moscow’s nature to avoid embarrassment on the international stage while pushing back on hegemonic powers like the United States. Finally, Russia takes pride in its culture and civilization that dates back over 1,000 years. This pride often manifests itself in national and foreign policy. Nicholas I used the “Uvarov doctrine” based on Russian orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality to unify Russian society in the 1830’s when autocratic rule was becoming more unpopular. The Uvarov doctrine was again used in the early-1900’s to mobilize support for Nicholas II prior to World War I, and even referenced in the late-1990’s as Russian President Vladimir Putin began to consolidate power. Contrary to U.S. values of democracy and individual freedom, Russia prioritizes power vested in the state—autocracy in some form—to provide for the people, from the rule of Peter the Great, the succession of czars, the totalitarian Soviet Union, to Putin’s current rule. Similarly, Russia rejects any outside influence, reflected in its staunch anti-westernism during the Cold War that continues today. Russia’s Enduring Character Shapes Its Posture Against the United States U.S.-Russia competition has persisted since World War II when the United States emerged as a great power. The establishment of the U.S.-led, rules-based world order and the NATO military alliance clashed with Russia’s own longstanding ambitions. While the U.S.-Russia relationship has evolved over time, Russia consistently acts in accordance with these interests defined by its enduring nature, and Putin’s regime is no different. Much of Russia’s aggression under Putin, including the invasions of Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria, reflects Moscow’s paranoia over defending its sovereignty. While the American public might see Putin as particularly aggressive compared to other recent leaders, according to Aron, “Putin is merely the latest Russian ruler to embrace Catherine the Great’s mantra” of extending borders to defend them. To paraphrase political scientist John Mearsheimer, Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine because the potential for those border countries to join NATO could threaten Russian sovereignty. Russia goes to extensive lengths to constrain U.S. missile defense out of a fear that the United States could gain the ability to defend against a Russian retaliatory strike. These efforts persist despite current and planned U.S. missile defense deployments remaining far too few to neutralize Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal and retaliatory capability. While seemingly illogical, vulnerability to a first strike poses an existential threat that feeds into Russian paranoia over any threat to its sovereignty. This paranoia suggests that the interest in mitigating U.S. strategic forces will not change. Putin’s regime also reflects a desire to heighten Russia’s status as a great power. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin described Russia as “a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years [that] has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.” He infamously referred to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” because Russia lost significant acquired territory. Maintaining its status as a nuclear power is also imperative to Russian great power pursuits. In addition to modernizing and numerically increasing existing nuclear capabilities, Russia is building entirely new nuclear capabilities, often referred to as “exotic” or “super” weapons, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and underwater drone that can reportedly carry a 100-megaton weapon. Many analysts argue that these weapons provide value in asserting Russia as a great nuclear power. Indeed, Putin recently boasted, “We have the most cutting-edge nuclear deterrence forces out of all nuclear powers.” Russia seeks to surpass the United States in nuclear capabilities to solidify its status as top nuclear power. The Kremlin uses its footholds around the world to undermine American soft power and world leadership, which stand in the way of its great power pursuits. For instance, Russia challenged America in Syria by employing its sea-launched cruise missiles (that could also carry nuclear weapons) and using its traction there to project power in the Middle East. Russia also leverages techniques to spread disinformation and propaganda, including cyber operations, media manipulation, and covert botnet operations to influence key politicians, journalists, and academics. This Russian effort to exert its influence around the world and challenge the United States has not changed from the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union used political warfare to hamper American influence in Europe and foment instability within the United States and between the United States and its allies. Putin justifies much of his aggression based on the long-standing Russian practice of rejecting external influence—in the contemporary case, Western democracy—in favor of historic Russian values and pride. Putin labeled Russia a “unique civilization” that has endured hundreds of years of great power wars. He considers rejecting western values critical to maintaining Russia’s greatness. When discussing the need to balance against U.S. unipolarity in 2007, Putin stated, “[W]e are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves,” referring to U.S. democracy-building efforts across the world. Just as Russia stopped the global domination efforts by the Mongols and Napoleon, it now sees the need to stop U.S. hegemony. This interest is vital to Russia’s historic character, and it is unlikely to change any time soon. The Accident of Putin? Scholars like Michael McFaul, President Obama’s Ambassador to Russia, argue that current competition with Russia is a result of the “accident of Putin.” They assert that the 1990’s were a missed opportunity to reform U.S.-Russia relations, and if long-time democracy advocate Boris Nemtsov were named prime minister instead of Putin in 1999, relations with Russia would look very different today. Based on this argument, the intensity of the competition with Russia depends heavily on the leader in power. While of course a given leader’s personality will have some impact on relations with the United States, Russia’s enduring nature demonstrates that so long as the United States obstructs Russia’s pursuit of its revisionist goals, competition will persist. Periods of improved relations between Russia and the United States only occur when Russia lacks the national power to aggressively pursue its overarching interests. The 1990’s are often characterized as a period of friendly relations with Russia given Yeltsin’s initial desire to become closer to the United States and even his attempt to join NATO. However, Russia’s conflicting interests with the United States were the same then as now; the difference was Russia’s lack of power after the Cold War. For example, in the early 1990’s, the UN and United States pressured Yeltsin to withdraw all Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia. Yeltsin tried to make withdrawal dependent on securing rights for Russian ethnic speakers in those countries, the same narrative Putin uses to justify the current occupation in Ukraine. The difference was that Yeltsin caved to the U.S. threat to withhold much-needed aid if Russia did not withdraw troops, while the United States and NATO have not been able to compel the current Russian regime—much stronger than that of the 1990’s—to withdraw from Ukraine. After Yeltsin withdrew troops in Estonia and Latvia, he tried to maintain leverage in former Soviet states, even encouraging a Crimean independence movement to impinge on Ukraine’s claims to the Black Sea Fleet. Again, the difference between Russia’s interest in Crimean independence in the 1990’s and today is that it did not then have the strength to actualize this goal. Indeed, according to Russia experts Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, “There was a general perception, in both the Yeltsin government and parliament, that Russia was being treated as a developing or second-tier country by the [W]est,” a sentiment that reflects Russia’s immense pride and desire to be treated as a great power. Russia’s inability to pursue its aggressive interests in the 1990’s has since changed. As the United States drew down its military forces to pivot to counterterrorism in the 2000’s, Russia sought to rebuild its military. It invested in asymmetric capabilities like informational and cyber warfare and pursued a nuclear modernization program, which is now at least 86% complete. (In comparison, the United States is barely beginning its long-overdue nuclear modernization effort.) Russia also rebuilt its stockpile of non-strategic, or tactical nuclear weapons unconstrained by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to the point where Russia now outnumbers the United States in this category by at least ten to one. The “accident of Putin” camp also references the reset in U.S.-Russian relations from 2009-2013 under Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. According to McFaul, Medvedev complied with Obama’s attempted reset because he sought Obama’s respect. However, McFaul concedes that Medvedev did little to actually implement democratic reforms, despite talking often about democracy. Under Medvedev’s administration, Russia turned off the natural gas supply to Ukraine; remained hostile to U.S. missile defenses even as Obama cancelled additional deployments; and vetoed UN action against the Syrian regime in 2011. The 2010 New START agreement accomplished little for this reset because the treaty’s cap on nuclear warheads enabled Russia to increase its forces to the outlined maximum while the United States made reductions. Russia also exploited the flawed treaty by building nuclear weapons the treaty did not limit, like nuclear-tipped hypersonic glide vehicles. While Medvedev’s tone seemed to offset competition, Russia’s great power interests persisted. Despite a complete change in government after the Cold War and an attempted reset in relations, Russia never strategically realigned. As historian Stephen Kotkin eloquently explains: In this context, it is useful to recognize that there has actually never been a period of sustained good relations between Russia and the United States. (Declassified documents reveal that even the World War II alliance was fraught with deeper distrust and greater cross purposes than has generally been understood.) This has been due not to misunderstandings, miscommunication, or hurt feelings but rather to divergent fundamental values and state interests, as each country has defined them. For Russia, the highest value is the state; for the United States, it is individual liberty, private property, and human rights, usually set out in opposition to the state. So expectations should be kept in check. Because Russia’s aggression stems not from a particular leader but from its enduring character, the United States can expect to continue competing with Russia even after Putin. U.S. Concessions Have Not Moderated Russian Behavior Russia interprets U.S. concessions as weakness that provides opportunities to further pursue its ambitions. Indeed, Russia’s goals extend beyond minimizing any threat posed by the United States to actively improving Russia’s status as a great power. A weakened United States will not persuade Russia to back down; rather, it will allow Russia to further propel its ambitions forward. The history of U.S.-Russian relations is replete with examples of this occurring. Indeed, Russia historically continued to build up its forces and pursue its adventurist ambitions even when the United States reduced its own forces and backed off the international stage. For example, as part of the Obama administration’s attempted reset, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) asserted that Russia and the United States were no longer adversaries and emphasized the reduction of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons. In fact, since the Cold War, the United States drastically reduced its nuclear stockpile, unilaterally removing thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons from its arsenal, halting nuclear weapons testing, and allowing its nuclear enterprise to atrophy. Today, there is no room to delay building back necessary capabilities. If, as one theory of victory posits, Russian aggression were solely a response to the U.S. threat, then the United States’ decision to shrink its nuclear capabilities should have assured Russia it had no need to further expand its arsenal. However, Russia instead dramatically increased its number and types of nuclear capabilities. The 2018 NPR stated, “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenals, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior…” Moscow argues that U.S. missile defense capabilities hamper Russia’s ability to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear strike and uses this flawed logic to justify new nuclear capabilities. In 2018, Putin cited U.S. missile defense as his impetus for developing six exotic new nuclear delivery systems, even though the United States has made only minor upgrades to its missile defense system over the last two decades. By that logic, were the United States to limit its missile defenses, Russia would not advance its offensive systems. Yet history illustrates that the exact opposite occurs. From 1972 to 1982, a time when the United States completely dismantled its existing homeland missile defense system, the Soviet Union added 10,000 warheads to its deployed arsenal – one of the largest force increases in its history. As famously stated by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown during the Cold War, “When we build, they build. When we stop, they build.” President Joe Biden’s administration has made multiple concessions for Putin to exploit. In response to Russia’s buildup of military forces near the Ukrainian border in the spring of 2021, the United States announced it would send warships to the Black Sea. Concerned with escalating tensions with Russia, Biden recalled the ships, and just days later, Moscow announced it would restrict access to the Black Sea for six months. The Biden administration’s extension of New START also feeds into Putin’s hands because it allows Russia to continue exploiting the treaty’s flaws and provides no incentive to halt its nuclear buildup. In fact, Putin already deployed to the Middle East a Kinzhal hypersonic missile—a new weapon not limited by New START—while the United States draws down its forces in the region and negotiates with Iran. The number of examples of Russia exploiting U.S. concessions to pursue its ambitions exceeds the scope of this paper. These cases demonstrate that Russia’s ambitions are such that it sees windows of opportunity when the United States exhibits weakness. Managing U.S.-Russian Competition As history demonstrates, Russia will continue to pursue its great power interests despite U.S. attempts at cooperation or even concessions so long as it has the power and tools required to do so. Since Russia is unlikely to strategically realign, the United States should not expect to stop Russia from pursuing its revisionist interests around the world. Instead, the best way to engage is to manage the competition to mitigate Russia’s ability to threaten the United States and moderate Russian aggression. At the very least, the United States needs to avoid making the unilateral concessions that provoke Russia to pursue further mischief. The United States should primarily focus on strengthening its position to check Russian aggression. While this paper does not seek to provide a comprehensive policy guide to Russian relations, the following recommendations illustrate ways to manage the competition. First, Congress and the administration should increase defense budgets to keep up with inflation at minimum and ideally meet the recommendation of three to five percent real growth as recommended by the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission. The Heritage Foundation’s 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength concludes that the military can only marginally meet the demands of the current threat environment, and as this paper discusses, Russia takes advantage of U.S. shortfalls. Sufficient defense budgets will enable the United States to make needed improvements to its forces by procuring more naval ships and aircraft, modernizing old equipment, and investing in advanced capabilities such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence. Second, the United States must pursue a modernized nuclear posture that can deter the Russian nuclear threat. This recommendation requires fully modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and avoiding policy proposals like a “no first use” declaratory policy that only exudes U.S. weakness and damages credibility of deterrence. The United States must also adjust its force posture to account for the increasing nuclear threat, including by pursuing the sea-launched cruise missile-nuclear proposed by the 2018 NPR. Any unilateral reductions in nuclear forces will only further encourage Russia and remove any incentive to negotiate a future arms control agreement. As Senator Deb Fischer (R–NE), the Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces aptly summarized: “Why would our competitors agree to new rounds of arms reductions if they knew the U.S. was cutting its forces anyway, regardless of whether they agreed to do the same?” >>> Russia and Realism, American-Style Third, the United States must prioritize countering Russian political warfare, a tool Russia has long used to gain an asymmetric advantage and exploit the gray zone area between war and peace. In the 1980’s, the Soviets undertook an intensive political warfare effort to forestall U.S. deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Yet in a show of perseverance, the United States successfully deployed Pershing II nuclear-armed missiles in Europe, a victory that eventually compelled Russia to agree to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 that banned all missiles of this kind. The United States must exercise this resiliency to political warfare efforts to manage competition with Russia today. Fourth, the United States must actively and forcefully respond to Russian aggression and coercion in Europe. For Ukraine and Georgia, this means increasing U.S. Navy presence in the Black Sea, increasing exercises with Ukrainian forces, and strengthening ties with both countries. The United States should also at least maintain a force presence in Eastern Europe and complete the Aegis Ashore missile defense project in Poland. While Biden allowed Russia to complete construction of its Nord Stream II pipeline, the United States must maintain sanctions pressure to prevent the dangerous project from becoming operational. The United States must find the best ways to demonstrate its resolve to deter Russian aggression in Europe and around the world because a lack thereof only begets Russian aggression. Conclusion Unfortunately, managing competition with Russia will require significant investment and effort that the American public and the current administration may be reluctant to make. The first step to managing Russian conflict is accepting that the United States is not likely to achieve an idealistic, decisive victory in the form of strategic realignment. Success will be measured, not as elimination of the Russian threat, but as a consistent containment of the threat over time. It might entail achieving arms control that limits Russia’s most dangerous nuclear forces, preventing further illegal Russian occupation in Europe, and killing the Nord Stream II pipeline. But the United States should prepare for Russia to cheat on a future arms control agreement, amass forces outside of its borders, and seek other economic arrangements that harm U.S. national security. The United States must avoid making the same mistake it made after the Cold War and draw down its forces when Russia becomes weak. Perhaps a less aggressive leader will replace Putin and restore some cooperation with the United States, but Russia’s long-standing interests will likely continue to cause it to clash with the United States. Long-term competition management from a position of strength will remain the United States’ best option.

### Transition Bad – China

#### A transition to Chinese hegemony is intrinsically violent

Pathak 15 – Sriparna, PhD from the Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese Studies), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, 10/15/15, “The “Peace” in China’s Peaceful Rise”, E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/15/the-peace-in-chinas-peaceful-rise/

In order to answer whether the rise of China in international relations is a peaceful one or whether it is a Thucydides trap, it is essential to understand what China means by a “peaceful” rise (later replaced with peaceful development) followed by a closer look at the theory and history of great power politics. The concept of “peaceful rise” (Zhongguo heping jueqi) was an official policy which emerged under the leadership of Hu Jintao. The term was an attempt to rebut against the “China threat theory”. The “peaceful rise” concept sought to characterise China as a responsible world player, emphasising soft power and that China is committed to its own internal issues and improving the welfare needs of its citizens before interfering in world affairs. However, the usage of the term “rise” was seen as controversial since the word could lead to perceptions that China’s “rise” is a threat to the established international order. Therefore, since 2004, the term has been replaced with “peaceful development” (Zhongguo heping fazhan). The need to come up with such a concept arose because, as has been seen in the past, the emergence of a new pole of power has often resulted in drastic changes in the global political structures and even war – which is well-explained through the theory of hegemonic stability and that of offensive realism in particular in International Relations. The term “peaceful rise” was coined by Zheng Bijian in late 2003. According to Zheng, the rise of new powers in the past lead to an imbalance in the global political structures and war because these powers chose the road of aggression and expansion. Zheng Bijian’s inspiration for the concept arose during an official visit to the U.S. in December 2002 where he reportedly experienced the pervasive discourse of the “China threat” and “China collapse” first hand. As prescribed by Zheng, the People’s Republic of China will develop peacefully and, in turn, help to maintain a peaceful environment. The speech given by Zheng was at the Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan province. The real attempt behind the introduction of the concept was to provide the international audience an introductory glimpse of the new strategic thinking that was emerging in China based on newer conceptualizations of power. In addition to the promotion of the concept of peaceful development, the leadership of the country has also embarked on a program of “neighbourhood diplomacy,” emphasising good neighbourliness and friendship and partnership; China has furthermore asserted that, unlike Western powers, it can rise peacefully due to its unique Confucian cultural tradition. However, history suggests that when a rapidly rising power threatens an established power, competition inevitably leads to conflict – the Thucydides trap in other words. According to a reading of European imperial history by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and Raler & Thomson, states seek to maximise their security and therefore their power, which inevitably leads to inter-state military competition. More recently, John Mearsheimer has undertaken an analysis of the Asia-Pacific region, which is now a region of emerging powers. In his book titled the Tragedy of Great Power Politics (published in 2001) he stated that the rise of China in the 21st century will be fraught with challenges. Against this, as stated previously, stands the Chinese leadership’s concept of peaceful development, which essentially states that Chinese development will not threaten the established order. Dr. Yuan-kan Wang, in his book Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, seeks to address the question of whether the Confucian exceptionalism will exempt China from the traditional patterns of conflict or not. The study undertaken by Dr. Wang challenges the popular narrative of China’s historic cultural pacifism, and states that the Confucian tradition is used as a legitimising mechanism for its development and growing military power. Dr. Wang’s conclusion posits that China will gradually shift to an offensive grand strategy once it has accumulated sufficient power.

#### The alternatives are worse--They offer optimistic Asian perspectives on American hegemony, but a strong US is key to economic integration, preventing obstructive authoritarian ideologies, and international cooperation.

**Nau 09** Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University, “Review: Is American Hegemony Bad or Just Better than Alternatives?”, March 2009, International Studies Review , Mar., 2009, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 2009), pp. 184-186

This collection of essays covers familiar ground but still offers value as a largely Asian perspective on hegemony and globalization. Fourteen of the 18 contributors are from Asia, nine from India alone. In an introduction by Chandra Chari, the volume rejects the notion, popular among Western realists, that American hegemony is necessary to avoid anarchy and expects "the processes of globalization, which have economically empowered a large number of countries across the globe," to provide new "bargaining chips" to strengthen multilateralism. Opening chapters address global perspectives. Eric Hobsbawn, the eminent British scholar, leads off with a blistering attack against the "political crazies" (p. 23) in the United States who after 9/11 abandoned the "emollient cream" (p. 22) of American Cold War policies and sought global hegemony through military might. If these crazies prevail, he predicts "another century of conflict" (p. 20). Akira Iriye and Joseph Nye, two equally eminent Harvard scholars, celebrate the "momentum toward transnationalism" (p. 33) ignited by globalization and expect that growing diversity especially on the economic and information chess boards of world affairs will check American military pretensions. William Wallace at the University of Saint Andrews worries that the world may be approaching "a nuclear tipping point beyond which a 'cascade of proliferation' could occur as states assume that the international nuclear order can no longer provide them with sufficient protection" (p. 56). Prem Shankar Jha, an Indian journalist, argues that "capitalism has burst its 'container'" for the fifth time in history, spawning each time widespread social disorder, while T.C.A. Srinivasa-Raghavan, an Indian business editor, sees a gathering storm of resource competition and inflation that "is very similar to what the world saw in the three decades prior to the First World War" (p. 82). Paul M. Evans, a Canadian scholar, sees some hope in the new focus on human security but then acknowledges that Asian countries in particular fear that "human security represents a Western agenda, centring (sic) on such liberal values and approaches as human rights and humanitarian intervention, and giving too little weight to economic and development priorities" (p. 84). Kanti Bajpai and Varun Sahni, Indian academics, close out the first part of the volume with a chapter that might have usefully served as the introduction, using three meanings of hegemony--ideological, liberal (institutional) and realist--to explore India's thinking and responses toward globalization. The second half of the book offers regional assessments of American hegemony and potential alternatives. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a distinguished Indian diplomat, looks at the European Union and concludes that "it is unlikely to result in a degree of unity that might pose a threat to American primacy" (p. 120). Jorge Chabat, a Mexican analyst, highlights the leftward tilt of Latin American politics but concludes that Brazil and Venezuela, the two countries with hegemonic aspirations to counter the United States, are likely only to "annoy the giant and tie him up in multilateral organizations" (p. 133). Yu Xin tian, a Chinese contributor, optimistically predicts the "peaceful rise" of China "whose only relatively difficult relationship is between China and Japan" (p. 146). Vyjayanti Raghavan, an Indian expert, agrees and concludes that if China and Japan cooperate, Asia can achieve "a form of regional economic integration" as Europe did when France and Germany cooperated (p. 173). Akiko Fukushima, a Japanese analyst, disagrees with the idea of Asian economic integration but envisions a "partnership" that respects rather than shares sovereignty. In remaining chapters, Simon S.C. Tay, a Singaporean scholar, notes rising regionalism centered around ASEAN; N. Ravi, an Indian journalist, sees India and other south Asian countries integrating more with outside regions than with one another; Hamid Ansari, India's vice president in summer 2008, despairs about American policy in the Middle East; and Abdul Lamin, a South African professor, urges Africa to seize opportunities for reform and integration with the global economy. What is curious about this volume, like so many on globalization, are the questions it does not address. There is no serious discussion, for example, of the security requirements of globalization. If the United States did not police globalization today, who would? It is true that hegemony is not the only peaceful configuration of power in history. The European Union, a community of relatively equal powers, is a current example. But Germany and France did not cooperate after World War II to end centuries of internecine European conflict without the presence of the US security umbrella. To expect China and Japan to cooper ate in the absence of a continuing US security role in Asia assumes a lot and requires at least some careful exploration. In addition, except for the contribution by Bajpai and Sahni, the volume is silent on the debate going on inside other countries about how those countries would run the world if the United States were weaker. The focus is entirely on US dominion which is strongly criticized. But why is there the implicit expectation that European, Chinese, Japanese, Brazilian or Indian foreign policy, which according to the volume should benefit from the new "bargaining chips" provided by globalization, would do much better? **It's natural for non-Americans to be more optimistic about their contributions to global peace and prosperity**, just as Americans may be about their contributions. But non-Americans have to make the case, just as they find fault with the case made by Americans. If American leadership has been so deficient, how did the Cold War end without a hot war and how has the world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since the Cold War ended? The volume seems completely oblivious to the fact that this latest "outburst" of capitalism **has raised the standard of living of more people** living under the poverty line than ever before. China and India, with most of the world's poorest population, are growing three and four times faster than Europe, Japan and America, and have been for 20 years or more. **Would this have happened under Soviet** (if Moscow had won the Cold War), **European, Chinese, Indian or Japanese hegemony or consortium**? Would these countries have championed freer trade policies for East Asian and now Chinese, Indian and Latin American exporters, or sympathized with the promotion of human rights in places such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, where Russian and Chinese policies currently block international efforts to stop humanitarian atrocities? The criticism of America is not the problem. A dominant power is fair game. But the criticism also ironically takes for granted the benefits of American hegemony--the open markets and global security provided by US foreign policy, the flexibility of America's middle classes, which have transitioned to better jobs in America so that more jobs could be created in poorer countries, and the light footprint of American imperialism that since 1945 has nurtured not colonies but democratic self-governments in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Admittedly, America's soft power is under a cloud, but the relevant question is, compared to what. Some, if not much, of the opposition to America has little to do with America. It has to do with authoritarian ideologies in other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, that prefer elitist over middle-class economies and national ist over liberal political ideologies

# Other

### Soft Power Bad

#### Link - US soft power hegemony is an invisible violence that reproduces the militaristic/masculine/imperialist paradigm.

**Riani** **22** [Riani, Hana, International Journal of Arts & Sciences; Cumberland , <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1768593554?parentSessionId=0%2F5Re%2BUcyNKaeGuv1Gpg%2Fr6B5z7oibCMPPjPT0ydQGw%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14667>, BK]

This paper aspires to consider the creation of a strong nexus between media and America soft power in the hope of examining how US global domination is animated by a homogenized philosophy that rests on the premise of soft power. The radical transition from the rhetoric of war and the binary conceptualization of Manichaeism to the mediatized discourse of popular culture sheds light on the pervasive role of media in reinvigorating and legitimizing US soft imperialism. The articulation of mediatized soft power by cultural icons masquerades as a faux critique of virtual colonialism to alleviate the crippling legacy of hard power or what has been known as George. W Bush doctrine and thus to forge a new euphemism to circumscribe America's hegemony. Following Gramscian parameters by treating culture as an ambitious western project, mediatized American icons seem to be the new art capable of reproducing US hegemony by tangling soft cultural politics in a strategy of an invisible violence to reproduce the paradigm coercion/attraction where hard power is supported by formidable soft power reserves. This stage is, for instance, epitomized by Hollywood movies as one of the most influential vectors of America's soft power politics yet loaded with hegemonic narratives.

Introduction

The longing to achieve a global utopia with American traits shifts in motives and emphasis as the coercive power of military intervention has recently proved to be chaotic to US international image. In the challenged atmosphere of the present world order, it seems that Niccolò Machiavelli's discourse positing to shield the continuance of a regime under the umbrella of coercion and threat is unrealistic. In fact, the proliferation of media plays a fundamental role in circulating and securing hegemonic ideological representations of the west under the veil of popular culture. The mediatized reinvigoration of soft power is aimed at rejecting the crusading tones and style of America military exceptionalism as embodied by George Bush during war times and therefore, seeking new ways to cushion real hard power dynamics. As such, the mitigating influences of soft power as encapsulated by popular cultural icons have changed the narratives and interpretations concerning Washington's political games. These include Hollywood movies where the hidden articulation of virtual imperialism masks the logic of America's expansionist empire so as to orchestrate a new world order and to repackage foreign policies. As a greater promoters and exporters of Americanism, these icons downplay the openly violent discourse of war and military crusades as a blatant attack on innocents; echo the core beliefs, vocabulary and ideals of the soft power ideology yet serve the same aims of reproducing and rearticulating "western way of conceiving and perceiving the world."1

Indeed, the emergence of a mediated culture is nothing but a metamorphosis of US hard power into a soft version where the cultural and political are backing up each other by ruthlessly defending the same corporate interests and politics. While George Bush crusades and Manichean speeches unleashed the messianic ideals of US military power and sought to aggressively export and promote American democracy, cultural icons sold through media lenses provide a similar contextual framework for a new cultural doctrine. Longing to exploit and empower US position, these icons have tremendously impacted on creating an alternative to militarist and unilateralist agenda and thus foreground the fundamental assumption that the American colonial paradigm is taking on different colours. As such, the lofty rhetoric of Hollywood movies enhances the vitality of soft power in an age where direct brutal force is left with no room to thrive.

Therefore, this article will first highlight the plagued image of a masculinised hegemonic America advocated by George W. Bush missionary crusades and the decline of hard power appeal. It attempts to present the Manichean discourse of war as a threatened, endangered one no longer able to sustain the supremacy of the US in world politics. Then, it will examine the reinvigoration of US soft power as an ideology that strengthens the correlation between cultural hegemony and soft imperialism. Based on specific case studies, i will show that Hollywood movies have become powerful demonstrations of soft power as an integral part of US foreign policy. Though adhering to the politics of soft powers, such movies are nothing but camouflages to the horrendous power of direct physical destruction. Covertly or overtly, Hollywood narratives boost thematic appropriations of western domination where such discursive spaces are the new sites of an invisible violence. Finally, the light will be spotted on the rise of counter powers to de Americanize the soft power discourse and deepen it beyond its American merit.

George W. Bush and the Decline of The Manichean Discourse of Coercive Power

### US econ heg bad

#### **NOTE**

\*\*\* this dissertation is literal FIRE – really good for possible US Heg K – something like US HEG = econ bad in east Asia/conflicts in east Asia – alt be something like accept a XYZ model of world governance instead of US unipolarity – could also be a good link to Cap K – US cap prolongs unipolarity – unipolarity = conflict, entrapment, encirclement – just bring in those other disads as impacts

Check out hypothesis section for more nuanced ideas ☺

<https://search.lib.umich.edu/articles/record/cdi_proquest_journals_2388066558?query=%22US%22+%22hegemony%22+%22unipolarity%22&sort=date_desc>